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# ***Daily Report***

# **Sub-Saharan Africa**

FBIS-AFR-91-142  
Wednesday  
24 July 1991

# Daily Report

## Sub-Saharan Africa

FBIS-AFR-91-142

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24 July 1991

NOTICE TO READERS: An \* indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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## Zaire

### Tshisekedi Reportedly Not Consulted by Mobutu

AB2307142091 London BBC World Service in English  
0630 GMT 23 Jul 91

[From the "Network Africa" program hosted by Neil Curry]

[Text] Let us get behind that story from Zaire—the announcement by President Mobutu that a man who has for 11 years led one of Zaire's main opposition groups has been appointed prime minister by Mr. Mobutu. Mr. Tshisekedi wa Mulumba held several ministerial posts under President Mobutu in the past and spent most of the 1970's as the first secretary of the ruling party. But since then, he has led the UDPS—that is the Union for Democracy and Social Progress—and he has been a strong critic of the president and his regime. Well, as the news story said, that is thought to be a move to defuse the tense political situation in Zaire. But in fact, many UDPS supporters took to the streets of Kinshasa last night to complain about the move. Well, I have just been getting a reaction to this news from an official of the UDPS in Brussels. Her name is Justine Buyo Kassavubu, and she is the party's diplomatic adviser:

[Kassavubu] Of course this appointment is a tremendous surprise, but it does not mean that we have accepted this appointment because the announcement was made without any contact with Mr. Tshisekedi himself.

[Curry] Do you know what Mr. Tshisekedi himself... [changes thought] how he has reacted to the announcement?

[Kassavubu] Yes! He told our people there not to be surprised because Mr. Mobutu has accustomed us since years to ridiculous surprise. This was a surprise for him too, but he just said that we should stay calm, that he was going to assess the situation with the other leaders of our party, and then after that first assessment, he will meet the leaders and members of other opposition parties, and then together they will make an announcement to the public.

[Curry] So that seems to imply that he is thinking about possibly accepting it, becoming the prime minister....

[Kassavubu, interrupting] No, no, no! It does not mean that at all! And that must be clear. It does not mean that at all. But you know, when such announcements come anywhere, as a political party, you have to assess the situation and now you think about how you are going to answer, and if you refuse—which seems to be the case this time—how you are going to express that refusal, you see!

[Curry] Do you not think that there is a risk that, having been offered the position of power by President Mobutu, if Mr. Tshisekedi actually turns it down, and if the party turns it down, they are really turning down an opportunity to take power?

[Kassavubu] No, no, no! If you know how Mobutu and what kind of person Mobutu is, then you cannot say that,

because it is just a trap. It could be another trap that Mobutu is just—you know—offering.

[Curry] Could you just explain in what way you think that it is a trap on behalf of the president?

[Kassavubu] Yes! Mr. Mobutu—one thing is what he does, and another thing is what he says and writes. So we have been trained to that kind of situation. And in the past, if you look at the tradition and history of UDPS, you will see that four years ago, another negotiation was held with Mobutu and initiated by Mobutu who offered some appointments for our members. And when they accepted that, then there was no more possibility to bring democracy in our country.

[Curry] So, are you saying that the president is trying to create a sort of split within the UDPS, create a situation where there will be some people who will be saying that Tshisekedi should become prime minister and some who are violently against it?

[Kassavubu] Of course, that is his strategy, and it has always been his strategy for years. So, it is not to split only our party, UDPS, but also to split that union of opposition that was confirmed last week by more than 200 associations and civil groups—you see—and more than 100 political parties. So that is another way of splitting that opposition.

### Tshisekedi Urged To Refuse Post

AB2307191491 Paris AFP in French 1154 GMT  
23 Jul 91

[Text] Kinshasa, 23 Jul (AFP)—Several thousands of militants of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS, one of the most important opposition political parties), last night asked Etienne Tshisekedi, who was yesterday appointed prime minister by Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko, to turn down the post. According to reliable witnesses, the demonstrators asked Mr. Tshisekedi to "turn down this post proposed by Mobutu."

Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko announced Monday his decision to appoint Mr. Tshisekedi, a long time opponent, to form a new national unity government in Zaire. In a speech to calm his followers, Mr. Tshisekedi described this appointment as a "piece of drama," stating that he was "the first to be surprised upon hearing his 'nomination' as the prime minister." He explained that the decision whether to accept Mr. Mobutu's proposal or not can only be made by the party, especially the collegial directorate.

Mr. Tshisekedi added that at noon he would meet with all the opposition leaders who last week formed a "sacred front" and that he would express his feelings after this meeting. The Zairean opposition formed a front made up of some 130 political parties, of which the major ones apart from the UDPS are the [Christian Social Democratic Party] PDCS and the Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans [UFERI].



The PDCS and the UFERI yesterday evening announced their refusal to participate in "a national unity government which will not be formed after the holding of an independent national conference."

Mr. Tshisekedi, one of the most popular UDPS leaders, asked his "militants" to have confidence in the party and urged them to be calm.

Several thousand sympathizers, shouting slogans hostile to President Mobutu, remained in front of Mr. Tshisekedi's house all night and morning. Tshisekedi found it very difficult to restore order to this close suburb of Kinshasa which has often been the venue of clashes between the UDPS militants and the law enforcement forces.

The demonstrators, however, warned him about any compromise with the government, which, according to some militants interviewed at the scene, could torpedo the national conference, which to them represents the only source of legitimacy for the formation of a new government in Zaire.

SALONGO, the government-oriented newspaper, today carried an article entitled "Tshisekedi, prime minister, will he accept it or not?" This clearly explains the surprise caused by his appointment by the head of state.

Also, all eyes are on the meeting of the UDPS Directorate which will discuss this party's participation in the new government. As to whether the other big opposition formations are against such a participation or not, the participation of the UDPS will spell, according to observers, the breaking up of the opposition which was united a very short while ago.

### Protests Continue Against Tshisekedi

*AB2307183291 London BBC World Service in English  
1515 GMT 23 Jul 91*

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] President Mobutu has really set the cat among the pigeons with his announcement that he wants the veteran opposition politician, Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, to be prime minister. He is the leader of the UDPS [Union for Democracy and Social Progress] and the fact that he is even thinking about the offer has thrown his party into some disarray. From Kinshasa Busongo Buyeme telexed this report.

[Begin studio announcer recording] The announcement was greeted with anger, mixed with indignation by the population of Kinshasa in general and by various activities of Mr. Tshisekedi's UDPS party in particular. Scenes of protest took place on Monday night and have been repeated again this morning to try and dissuade Mr. Tshisekedi from accepting the new post.

Tens of thousands of party activists this afternoon converged on Mr. Tshisekedi's house and chanted angry slogans about the prime minister and the head of state,

President Mobutu. They shouted, we refuse, we refuse, and they raised clinched fists towards passers-by. In front of the house the enormous crowd screamed threats of death and destruction against their leader's property if he eventually agreed to form a government under President Mobutu's authority.

Mr. Tshisekedi only managed to calm the crowd by announcing that he had left the decision on whether to take the job of prime minister to his party and to the opposition coalition. However, observers note that Mr. Tshisekedi's nomination seems to be the result of negotiations in which both sides have made important concessions.

This theory is corroborated by the fact that yesterday an extraordinary session of the National Assembly was called which will be dedicated to revising the Constitution, especially those parts covering the head of state's powers. They will be discussing the former so-called "no go" area for the opposition which permits President Mobutu to directly control, among other key areas, the army, the security services and the Bank of Zaire.

Observers say that the stripping of these powers is one of the conditions under which Mr. Tshisekedi would agree to form a government. But he still has to convince his partners in the opposition coalition. Only last week, they rejected the idea of any government of national unity formed before the national conference had taken place and they decided to campaign for the national conference to be a sovereign body.

The fact that President Mobutu has named such a prominent opposition figure as prime minister is seen as a climbdown by the head of state in the face of a regrouped opposition speaking with a single voice. Opposition leaders have been meeting since this morning to consider their position and they say that they will give an official announcement later.

It seems that the surprise nomination of Mr. Tshisekedi as prime minister could divide the opposition parties which have only just joined together and whose union is still fragile. If Mr. Tshisekedi turns down the job, Zaire risks a new political crisis which will only make the disastrous economic situation worse. [end recording]

### Tshisekedi Turns Down Nomination

*AB2307183991 Paris AFP in English 1825 GMT  
23 Jul 91*

[Text] Brussels, July 23 (AFP)—Zairean opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi has turned down his nomination as prime minister, his political party announced Tuesday. President Mobutu Sese Seko nominated Mr. Tshisekedi for the job Monday. His refusal was announced by Omer N'Kamba, secretary for foreign relations of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress, and reported here by the Belgian news agency BELGA.

**De Klerk Refuses Comment on Inkatha Cash Issue**

*MB2307181691 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1807 GMT 23 Jul 91*

[Text] Pretoria July 23 SAPA—State President Mr. F.W. de Klerk on Tuesday refused to comment on the secret funds given by the government to Inkatha. He said at a press conference in Pretoria he did not wish to make a statement on the matter but would issue a full statement next week Tuesday, at a press conference. "We will face the press on that issue." The minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Pik Botha, will also hold a press conference on the matter on Thursday.

Asked if there would be any resignations, Mr. de Klerk replied: "I will be making a statement on Tuesday". Mr. de Klerk said a cabinet meeting was scheduled to be held on Wednesday and a "regular, scheduled" State Security Council meeting on Monday before he could make a full statement.

Mr. de Klerk, accompanied by Mr. Botha, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Leon Wessels, and Law and Order Minister Mr. Adriaan Vlok returned to Pretoria on Tuesday evening from the so-called "bush conference" at which the matter of the Inkatha funding was presumed to be on the agenda.

Mr. de Klerk and the ministers were to hold talks with Bophuthatswana President Lucas Mangope on Tuesday evening following the press conference.

**Buthelezi Aid Accepts Responsibility for Funds**

*MB2307150291 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1431 GMT 23 Jul 91*

[SAPA PR Wire Service, issued by Inkatha Freedom Party]

[Text] Press statement

By Mr M Z Khumalo personal assistant

to the president of Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP]

I want to address the issue of the funding by the South African Government of two Inkatha rallies—namely, one in November 1989 and one in March 1990.

I state that I knew that the money came from the South African Government. Two deposits amounting to r[and]250,000 were made by me to cover payments for the costs of transport, placards and banners and such things associated with rallies. I accounted fully for the expenditure of the money to the officer who had handed over the funds to me. Every cent from the South African Government that was deposited was spent on the promotion of peace through these rallies and on nothing else.

These two rallies were held at a time when Inkatha was actively fund-raising in order to promote peace and to

continue its long hard fight against sanctions. Therefore anonymous donations were welcomed.

The question that I know will bother many people now that I am identifying myself as the person in Inkatha who was involved in this funding is why I did not tell my president what the source of the funds was. I have worked under my president for the last 15 years and I knew without a doubt that he would have rejected the proposal out of hand, whilst I on the other hand knew that this assistance would be very helpful in promoting these peace rallies.

Another question which will also be asked is why I did not inform the president afterwards. I want to state that I have worked under my president for the last 15 years and knew very well that he would immediately disassociate himself with this action and would have exposed me immediately.

I want to apologise very sincerely to my president for having betrayed his trust in not telling him about the source of these funds. I hope some time in the future he will appreciate my motivation and will appreciate that my actions were not intended to hurt him or the organisation in the manner in which I now see it has done so.

I can only hope that in due course my president will come to see that I only did what I thought was right at the time and that in his greatness, he will be able to forgive me.

I have therefore resigned from employment by the IFP and as personal assistant to the president with immediate effect.

I want to thank my president and the leadership of Inkatha Freedom Party and its entire membership for having afforded me the opportunity to serve my people and my country. If there are any amongst them who feel they have been disgraced by my action, I ask for forgiveness. I am convinced that in that final mile to meet my Maker I will be met by people who suffered and died in the struggle who will welcome me and escort me through those final gates of eternal life.

I would have felt much better were I able to write out a cheque from my personal account and refund this money to the South African taxpayer, but I just do not have the means to do so.

I wish to appeal to every South African out there who has the interests of our country at heart to assist in undoing the damage and organisational hardship which the refund now going to be made by the IFP president of R250,000 to the Department of Foreign Affairs from IFP funds will cause the party.

### **Inkatha Officials on Resignation**

*MB2307172091 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1655 GMT 23 Jul 91*

[Excerpts] Pretoria July 23 SAPA—Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP] leader Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi is to give a refund of R[and]250,000 to the Department of Foreign Affairs to repay the department for money given to the party for rallies. A statement by Chief Buthelezi's personal assistant Mr M.Z. Khumalo, who resigned on Tuesday with immediate effect, said the refund would come from IFP funds. [passage omitted] Mr Khumalo's statement was read out at a media conference in Pretoria.

Inkatha officers Sue Vos, Walter Felgate and Musa Myeni were at the press conference, but journalists at the conference expressed their displeasure that Mr Khumalo was not on hand to answer questions. [passage omitted]

Asked at the heated conference at the Burgerspark Hotel whether the United Workers's Union of South Africa [UMUSA] would refund R1.5 million in government donations as well, Mr Myeni said UWUSA was an independent trade union. He charged Inkatha had no relationship with UWUSA and the union would have to explain the issue itself.

Ms Vos said it was not unusual for only one Inkatha official to know about such large amounts as R250,000 because large amounts often went through the account into which it had been deposited. Mr Khumalo had held a senior position and was able to take initiatives.

Mr Myeni said the two amounts totalling R250,000 were the only secret government funds Inkatha knew about, but because amounts were deposited anonymously, the organisation did not always know where the money came from. The account was public knowledge and its number had been published in newspapers.

Asked about Mr Khumalo's absence at the conference, Mr Felgate said: "He's resigned today. He is no longer in our employ. We don't want him in our midst. He is not with us". Said Mr Myeni: "It is for you to seek and find him if you want that but we can't sit with him". He added, "If he did not resign we would have dismissed him but he has denied us that opportunity. So what other punishment can we meet out?"

Ms Vos alleged Mr Buthelezi had previously been offered foreign affairs money to fight sanctions abroad but refused it.

### **Buthelezi Defends Position on Funding Issue**

*MB2207180491 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network  
in English 1840 GMT 21 Jul 91*

[Panel discussion between Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) President Mangosuthu Buthelezi, IFP Chairman Frank Mdlalose, IFP Central Committee Member Walter Felgate, and IFP Spokesman Musa Myeni, in Ulundi, and VRYE WEEKBLAD editor Max du Preez, THE STAR

Political Editor Shaun Johnson, and SOWETAN deputy editor Len Maseko, in Johannesburg; moderated by John Bishop in Ulundi, with introduction by Callie Long, on the "AGENDA" program—live]

[Text] [Long] We cross now to John Bishop in Ulundi for the face-to-face debate with the Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP]. I'll be back to introduce the members of the press, John.

[Bishop] Thank you very much Callie. Yes back here a live transmission from Ulundi. A marvelous auditorium, and here to bless it Chief Minister Buthelezi, thanks for joining us, Dr. Frank Mdlalose, Mr. Felgate, and Mr. Musa Myeni. They are going to debate the issue—a double issue I should say—the WEEKLY MAIL story, of course, and your conference. But for the moment introductions again from Callie.

[Callie] Thank you John. Here in the studio we have Max du Preez, editor of VRYE WEEKBLAD; Shaun Johnson of THE STAR; and Len Maseko, deputy news editor of the SOWETAN. Welcome gentlemen. John?

[Bishop] Back again, it's like a game of tennis, gentlemen. Welcome to our journalistic friends in Johannesburg. By the way you'll have your chance, you must have been chaffing at the bit to ask questions of Chief Buthelezi and his colleagues—that comes in a moment or two. First of all we're going to have a general wrap up of that conference from Lester Venter, political correspondent. So Mr. Venter, you're in the center.

[Venter] Well, John, central to the issues at the conference, were the cutting questions of politics today, negotiations, and violence. The conference was largely overshadowed by the controversy that has arisen over financial links between Inkatha and the government, but more about that in a moment. On negotiations the Inkatha Freedom Party decided to ask President de Klerk to convene a multiparty conference without any further delay. But, the IFP delivered two firm no's. It said no to the formation of any alliance with any party at this stage, and that includes the National Party on the one hand, and a patriotic front being discussed by the ANC [African National Congress] and the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] on the other hand. The Inkatha Freedom Party said that it would not be going to the multiparty conference, even so much as to discuss the formation of a constituent assembly or an interim government.

As far as a view of the future is concerned, according to Inkatha, the largely Zulu party, the party made it clear that it favors what it calls, proper representation for all racial groups at the national level, and it favors a devolution of power to regional levels, where matters such as health and education will be administered by regional authorities. Violence, it believes, should be tackled on a multiplicity of levels, including the elimination of poverty and the combating of common crime. And on the political level the party recommitted itself to convening a committee between itself and the ANC.

Economically the party, like its adversary the ANC, does not have a fully fledged economic policy at present, but the party made it clear that it is uncompromising on its commitment to a free enterprise economy. John?

[Bishop] Thank you very much indeed Lester. Well, first question to you and then I'm going to hand you over to the journalists waiting in the Johannesburg studio. First question to you Chief Minister. What's your position now? Are you still denying any knowledge that money was given to you to take on the ANC?

[Buthelezi] This is clap trap, and it was, I mean—it is such a minuscule amount that I would really need my head read to think that I could take on ANC on the basis of the 250,000 rands. I mean, that is just a blatant lie.

[Bishop] Yes, and the allegation that you were hobnobbing with the security police, particularly Major Louis Botha?

[Buthelezi] Well, that is not hobnobbing. Mr. Bishop, because as you know, legally when I get to Durban then the South African Police is in charge of my security, and Maj. Botha was therefore assigned to look after my security in Durban. In fact, on 29 to 30 March when we sat together with the president of the ANC for six hours, he was in charge of the security. Now I wouldn't say that some security service, I mean, they were representing then the security services that look after Dr. Mandela, that he is hobnobbing with them.

[Bishop] Hmm. Now, but the idea that you knew about this money which was being put into the IFP bank account, and you knew what it was for—I mean, that is the allegation there?

[Buthelezi] Well, that is the allegation, but I have said openly that there is that account in Durban which is used for humanitarian purposes, for disasters, for refugees, for any people who want to donate; and sometimes people donate money anonymously—some people in business even, who don't want to be identified. But even for that rally, now, Mr. Bishop, I can tell you that 100,000 [rands] was actually contributed directly to our account here in Ulundi by Mr. Zoolman who had gathered the money from the business community, because it was a meeting in connection with the violence. I mean, we were so concerned about the violence that we wanted to, you know, to meet to talk about the violence, and the rally last year in fact was to celebrate the release of the political prisoners, including Mr. Mandela.

[Bishop] Chief Buthelezi, we are going to go back to Johannesburg in a moment or two, but just to finish off this line of questioning—so the 250,000 [rands] mentioned, you never knew that it was security police money, is that so?

[Buthelezi] No.

[Bishop] But how is that possible? A huge amount like that? Wouldn't you query it? Wouldn't you say where did this...

[Buthelezi, interrupting] But it was not in our normal what you call it, and in fact I am not the person who buys banners, and things like that. [sentence as heard]

[Bishop] But don't you look at the accounts?

[Buthelezi] No, no.

[Bishop] You never check the accounts?

[Buthelezi] We are audited, John, in our account in Ulundi. But nevertheless, that account in Durban was a special, you know, account—an emergency account which is there for special cases I have just stated to you.

[Bishop] Well, thank you. Now let's go to Johannesburg. Which of our guests up there would like to pose some questions?

[Du Preez] John, maybe I should ask the chief minister—Mr. Buthelezi, can I ask you whether you are prepared to state categorically to the nation on television tonight that you would be prepared to resign if anybody came up with proof that you had knowledge of support aid from the National Intelligence Service [NIS], the military intelligence, or any other state security agency in aiding Inkatha?

[Buthelezi] [Word indistinct] well in fact today—this suggestion was made already this morning by the SUNDAY TIMES, and in fact I put it to the delegates. I thought it was very opportune that I should put that to the delegates, and of course they feel differently about it, because I'm just quite fed up with this kind of thing.

[Du Preez] So if we bring proof toward the end of the week, will you resign or will you just change your reaction?

[Buthelezi] To prove what?

[Bishop] If you, ehh sorry, Max du Preez, you are saying you might bring, or you could bring proof toward the end of the week?

[Du Preez] Proof that Dr. Buthelezi knew about aid to Inkatha from state agencies such as military intelligence, NIS, and the police force itself.

[Bishop] Can you bring that? Are you going to?

[Du Preez] I could bring it. We have a very good chance of doing it on a documentary basis by the end of this week.

[Bishop] Well, there you are....

[Buthelezi, interrupting] I would be interested to see that when it happens.



[Du Preez] What would your reaction be? I am asking you, would you go on panel tonight and say: I will resign if anybody can prove that I knew?

[Buthelezi] Well, that is hypothetical. I mean, let it happen. I'll make the decision then.

[Bishop] That's fair enough, isn't it Max du Preez? You don't sign your signature until you have read the fine print, do you?

[Du Preez] Well, I think Mr. Buthelezi is keeping his back door open, because my suggestion tonight is that—well, Mr. Buthelezi is saying that he knew nothing. He is in effect virtually saying that Mr. Vlok is lying, he is definitely saying that a policeman who Mr. Vlok says is an honorable man is lying.

[Buthelezi] Mr. du Preez, I tell you for a fact that it is Mr. Vlok himself—I saw the program here—he never discussed the matter with me, and Mr. Botha's memorandum that was issued from the WEEKLY MAIL, where he makes a lot of claims about my colleagues, about all sorts of things, in fact amazed me, because I don't know what motivated Maj. Botha to do that, because it is just absolutely not true.

[Du Preez] Mr. Buthelezi, can I ask you another way round? When the Democratic Party member of Parliament for Mhlanga, Mr. Kobus Jordaan, asked the state president earlier this year in parliament whether the NIS was supporting Inkatha, and when he asked the minister of defense, and the minister of law and order, whether the police, or the defense force was supporting Inkatha, neither of these three gentlemen were prepared to say yes or no. Now to an ordinary person like me that mean yes. When you saw that, when you heard that—and keeping in mind that you are saying that you didn't know of any support coming from these guys—didn't you think of questioning, asking questions, maybe phoning the president and saying: Why aren't you just saying no? Or is it true?

[Buthelezi] No, I think there are better things that I discuss with the president than that at this time.

[Du Preez] You still say that in hindsight?

[Buthelezi] I say that at this time, you know, we are talking about the future of this country with the president, and the time that I spend with him we discuss, you know, about negotiations, about a multiparty conference, and things like that. So, I mean, I never have time to—I mean it never occurred in my mind. Maybe, as you suggest, I should have asked him, but I mean, the time that I have with him is always limited, and I always confine my discussions with the state president to these matters which I think are of crucial importance to all the people of this country.

[Bishop] Max du Preez, do you want to follow up on that?

[Du Preez] I think I will give my colleagues a chance.

[Bishop] Alright, one of your colleagues. Just come in please.

[Johnson] If I could come in, John—Shaun Johnson.

[Bishop] Yes.

[Johnson] If I could ask Mr. Buthelezi—would you now support the ANC's call for an interim government, in the light of the events that we have just run through, as it seems to many political observers—myself included—that it is has now been demonstrated quite clearly that the existing government cannot neutrally manage the transition process. It has meddled, and it has been caught meddling. Will you now support the call for an neutral interim government?

[Buthelezi] No, I wouldn't like to be part of a leap, you know, into darkness. I believe that, in fact, at the multiparty conference it would be a question that we would discuss—who would supervise, you know, the negotiations, because I do believe that those are the issues that should be decided by all parties as to who will preside, you know, and how. The president himself has spoken about a transitional government. So, I believe that those are issues that we'll discuss then. But you just blandly say that I support an interim government without knowing what kind of creature that is. I am not prepared to do that.

[Johnson] If I could just follow up.

[Bishop] Yes please.

[Johnson] In the light of your statement, and repeated statement, that you did not know about this money, or its source, or its purpose, have you lost faith in the ability of this government to be neutral? Have you personally lost faith?

[Buthelezi] No, I mean, the issue Mr. Johnson is that—this morning, I think, Mr. Botha actually said that the money came from his department, and that he believed that because of a certain convergence of interests as far as sanctions are concerned—which I have always opposed....

[Bishop, interrupting] That's Mr. Pik Botha?

[Buthelezi] Yes, Mr. Pik Botha the foreign minister said so. Now I didn't know at that time. But, I mean, if the thing was put to me, probably, I would have consulted, because we are now, Mr. Johnson, facing a quite different South Africa, isn't it? I wouldn't think that, you know, five years ago or even three years ago I would imagine that the ANC would dine with President de Klerk and his cabinet, and that they would be guests of the president, and that members of the national intelligence should bring top ranking officials of the ANC to me clandestinely in Ulundi and sit through discussions with them.

We are facing quite a different South Africa now. I mean, I remember that about six or more years ago, I am not sure now, the commissioner general then who represented the government here put to me that, you know, he had a message from the foreign minister that there was money

available, since they recognized that, you know, I fought sanctions, and they realized that our budget is stringent; that if I wanted to go overseas foreign affairs has got this money. And I refused because at that time I believed that it would have created a lot of misunderstanding, because whenever I go overseas, some of my enemies, especially in America, usually say that, you know, I am sent by the government, when that is not at all.

So that, I think, the matter would be quite different today. I have not been told, but I do believe that probably I would have consulted about it, because just now, I mean just last week, my colleague next to me consulted me because the government is buying a disused, you know, convent to house exiles of the ANC. I mean, that is a different South Africa that we face. That is also taxpayer's money.

[Bishop] Shaun Johnson, follow up.

[Johnson] Should we take it years back onto the broader picture, I couldn't agree more that this does have deep and profound implications for the whole negotiations process. I wonder then, Mr. Buthelezi, whether you would not take this opportunity now, tonight, to perhaps in a statesman-like fashion apologize to Mr. Mandela and the ANC for having vilified them for so long for making the very suggestion that perhaps there was collusion of some sort? Would you make that conciliatory gesture tonight?

[Buthelezi] I am not prepared to do that. I am not prepared to...

[Johnson, interrupting] Would you explain why?

[Buthelezi] I am not prepared to do that.

[Johnson] Do you not think it would perhaps aid the process? It would seem that this is more than a hiccup. It is potentially a very damaging political scandal.

[Buthelezi] Well, if you...

[Bishop, interrupting] Can I just interrupt a moment?

[Buthelezi, continuing] ...you want to make it a big political scandal, I mean, that's your choice. I mean, if you are here as their representative, Mr. Johnson, that is your choice too.

[Bishop] Mr. Johnson, can I just interrupt for a moment? Can we get it straight? What are you asking the chief minister to apologize for? What would the form of the apology be?

[Johnson] I am asking whether he would consider it, John, as you know, there has been over the last months a raising of temperature in the relationship between the ANC and the IFP. Much of this has centered around persistent allegations by the ANC that the playing field was not flat, that the security forces in one form or another were colluding with Inkatha. On this particular issue we found that they have colluded. I accept that the

chief minister says he didn't know about it. But he has, in a sense, a prime ministerial responsibility, doesn't he to say: Yes it has happened, I am sorry that it has happened, perhaps we can now clear this out and square that playing course.

[Bishop] Oh yes. So you are not asking him to apologize for something he says he knows nothing about? You are asking him to apologize for the general aspect of the occurrence? Is that it?

[Johnson] For the fact that this has taken place, and for the fact that the ANC was vilified so very keenly...

[Buthelezi, interrupting] By whom?

[Johnson] By Inkatha spokespeople over the months...

[Buthelezi, interrupting] Vilified or criticized?

[Johnson] I would use the word vilified.

[Buthelezi] In what sense? Just quote an example of vilification.

[Johnson] For having made the allegation that there was collusion between the security forces and Inkatha. There were many, many occasions on which the ANC was accused of being divisive, of potentially leading to violence.

[Bishop] So, there you have it, Chief Minister. Are you going to apologize for the manner, or in the manner in which Mr. Johnson describes?

[Buthelezi] Well, I really don't know why he put such a question to me, because I can also ask whether the ANC has ever apologized for civilians that were killed; whether the ANC has apologized for caches of arms that are all over the place; whether the ANC would apologize also for our members that have been killed by their members, you know, because as much as our members have been sucked into the violence, you know, I mean, that's a very...

[Bishop, interrupting] So, you are not going to do it anyway?

[Buthelezi] I am not going to do it.

[Bishop] We haven't heard from Mr. Maseko. Don't you have a question at this point, Mr. Maseko, perhaps?

[Maseko] I would like to ask Chief Buthelezi whether, as he says, that he didn't know where the money came from, in that account. He has an open account the public could contribute into. Now, Minister Vlok is on record as having said that you accounted for every cent that you got from the police. Now, who were you accounting to if you didn't know who had contributed?

[Buthelezi] But you should have asked that from Mr. Vlok. He didn't say Buthelezi accounted to him for every cent, did he? That I saw you...

[Maseko, interrupting] He said senior Inkatha officials accounted for every cent...

[Buthelezi, interrupting] But I would be very grateful if he specifically told me who were these senior officials of Inkatha, because, you know, on the day this matter, you know, came up I actually woke up my colleague, the Reverend Mthethwa, who was mentioned as having also with me thanked Brigadier Steyn; and I woke him up at 12 o'clock because I was concerned, wanting to know whether he has ever done such a thing, and he didn't know anything about that.

[Bishop] At this point, Chief Minister, can I just seek some clarifications? Well, this money comes in, and you stated time and time again over the last few days that you know nothing about its whereabouts. It just comes into the account. What about your auditors then? Wouldn't they query large sums like that?

[Buthelezi] Well, we are audited, you know, we have our auditors, and our statements come before the national council and before our Central Committee.

[Bishop] Isn't that a large sum, 120,000, and two—well, the total was 250,000. Is that a large sum that would make an auditor say: Hey, there is a very generous donor here.

[Buthelezi] No, but actually I have just told you that, you know, there are many other people that contribute toward that...

[Bishop, interrupting] But that's what I mean, in the context of....

[Buthelezi, interrupting] They do contribute to that fund for specific things, for specific things, not into our general fund.

[Bishop] Gentlemen in Johannesburg, do you have more questions on this WEEKLY MAIL story?

[Du Preez] Well, I was just wondering, John, whether, if Chief Buthelezi can come to us and just deny knowledge of everything? Perhaps. He has so far denied also that the police are helping Inkatha, the Inkatha impis [regiments] in the violence in the townships. I see in this recent survey that Laurence Schlemmer of the Center of Policy Studies had done that 30 percent of all Inkatha members who were questioned blamed Inkatha for starting the violence. Mr. Buthelezi keeps on denying that. Maybe he is also denying it in the same fashion. Maybe he doesn't know that the Army and the police are...

[Buthelezi, interrupting] Well, there are many people, there are many people, Mr. du Preez, that believe what they read in newspapers. You know, that's my experience. I mean, you people in the newspaper are so anti-Inkatha and so much anti-us that, you know, every time Inkatha people, you know, retaliate when they have been attacked—which is a

fact which happens. [sentence as heard] For instance, when the mayor of Diepmeadow died, you know, as they were going to the cemetery they were attacked, and then they indulged in some hot pursuit by chasing those people who had attacked them and they killed them, and of course in the media the following day it was flashed that, you know, Inkatha had killed people—and it was true—but, I mean, the story was not complete because no one explained how it had happened.

And that has been going on for quite a long time now, because in the media, each time Inkatha reacts to something, then, you know, then people say Inkatha has done this; but they never really just start things, except of course, I would admit that people haven't been [word indistinct] violence which has become endemic as our violence has been. It is true that there is retaliatory violence sometimes. There is preemptive violence as well. I have always said this very openly, I have never...

[Bishop, interrupting] Mr. Buthelezi, in this very same survey by Laurence Schlemmer, he found again, as other surveys had done, that Inkatha only has 5 percent urban black support. Now, I see you on television very regularly—you have an open door in London and Washington and Bonn. You are regarded by many as a national leader—quite out of proportion with 5 percent. Is it perhaps not true that it is your organization's capacity for violence and killing that has made you such a prominent...

[Buthelezi, interrupting] That's absolute balderdash, you know, on your part. You are talking nonsense.

[Bishop] Have you fought your way to the top then?

[Buthelezi] I mean, all this time, you know, you can't say that my career as a political leader, you know, started when the violence started. You know, I have done many things for this country. I campaigned for the release of Dr. Mandela and made it a complete condition that I would not negotiate with the government until he was released, and he communicated with me while he was in jail and thanked me publicly for that. There was no violence then.

[Bishop] Thanks for that. Gentlemen out there, what I am going to do now [changes thought] because I think you've had a fair crack, haven't you, at the chief minister. Musa Myeni is dying to say something. Let's go across to you, Mr. Myeni.

[Myeni] Thank you, John. What I think is also very noteworthy is the campaign by the ANC-Communist Party alliance to collect a million signatures for their constituent assembly which they haven't up to now succeeded to collect, and yet the polls which are being quoted in the media points to one fact: that the ANC has an overwhelming majority of support, but they can't even collect one million.



[Bishop] Are you saying that the media is pulling its massive weight behind the ANC? Is that what you are saying?

[Myeni] To even support that the SUNDAY TIMES of today, 21 July, did one big mistake. They are estimating that people who attended the AGM [annual general meeting] of the IFP today, or this weekend, were 2,400, and they did not even show one picture of that particular conference.

[Bishop] Well, the SUNDAY TIMES isn't here, but what about the VRYE WEEKBLAD? Are you a mouthpiece for the ANC-SACP [South African Communist Party] alliance, Max du Preez?

[Du Preez] Certainly not, and anybody who reads VRYE WEEKBLAD would know that. I would, however, not want to start talking about VRYE WEEKBLAD. I think maybe, John, with your permission, if I can, now that we are talking to Mr. Myeni, maybe we should ask Mr. Myeni and the other gentlemen in the studio whether they knew about Major Botha, whether they knew about this money, whether they perhaps reported back.

[Bishop] Indeed, but I just want to go at you for a minute, Max du Preez. Who do you support?

[Du Preez] I support a free press; I support human rights; I support open information for everybody. I think we see ourselves as a watchdog on behalf of the public.

[Bishop] Okay, we'll put that other question then, now, please—thank you. You wanted to go across the panel, didn't you, and formulate another question.

[Du Preez] Yes, I wanted to ask Mr. Myeni and the other members of the panel there. We have now listened to Buthelezi's denial; he says he didn't know. Did you know about the money? Did you perhaps report back?

[Bishop] Okay, let's ask Dr. Frank Mdlalose. Did you know about the money?

[Mdlalose] No, nothing at all about it. The first time I heard about it was when it came out in the press.

[Bishop] Mr. Felgate.

[Felgate] Not at all. This weekend of all weekends we had the opportunity of speaking to other leaders and obviously this is very topical. We asked everybody: Did you know about this? And honestly, there is not one leader who knew anything about this. The whole credibility rests on the interpretation of a letter which could have well been written by somebody who wants to impress his superiors and present an image of information which wasn't true.

[Du Preez] But the money was used, Mr. Felgate; the money was used by Inkatha and they reported back to the government.

[Felgate] We don't know that. We don't know that. You say that. What kind of report-back? Who reported back? We've got no idea.

[Du Preez] Well, you used the money.

[Felgate] Let me finish. We are going to do our own looking into the matter. We are going to go into our own affairs, but until we have done it we can't make any more comments. Don't hang things on us on the basis of one little paper.

[Du Preez] Will you also investigate possibly that the National Intelligence Service has been giving support to Inkatha?

[Felgate] We will investigate every possibility. We want our name cleared. We want to know what is going on. We don't want to know [changes thought] not know what our own senior officials are doing. If they have done anything we are going to look into the matter, but we can't at this stage say more than that.

[Bishop] Mr. Myeni?

[Myeni] I would like to also ask these industrious journalists to find out for us all as taxpayers in South Africa how much the South African Government has paid or spent to accommodate ANC delegates when they went to speak to the government in Cape Town, Groote Schuur. How much has been spent to bring back ANC exiles from abroad? We would like to know because I am a taxpayer.

[Bishop] They certainly did that, but before I ask our journalists to comment on that, they did it quite openly, didn't they?

[Myeni] We would like to know.

[Bishop] There is an underground operation alleged here, isn't there?

[Myeni] First of all, what I think is also interesting is that...

[Bishop, interrupting] But is that not true?

[Myeni] Sure. The same journalists over the years have been accusing the South African Government of destabilizing political parties. Why can't this conclusion be applicable in this case, in a case where the leadership of the Inkatha Freedom Party did not know a thing about that and yet the money was deposited?

[Bishop] While you're on that can I go back to the chief minister here please. Anton Harber isn't here. He was meant to be on this panel but he decided to go solo with the minister, so we don't have him here tonight but, did he approach you before he published his story?

[Buthelezi] In fact, you know, it was typical of Mr. Harber. Just a day or two before I was due to go to Washington and London, you know, they published a story about a certain Major Basson whom I do not know.

[Bishop] A Major Basson?

[Buthelezi] A Major Basson, and they claimed that this gentleman claimed that he gave arms to the Inkatha Freedom Party members. Now that was strategically done just before I went overseas. Now even with this thing now ...

[Bishop, interrupting] This new story, the WEEKLY MAIL ...

[Buthelezi, continues] The new story, the WEEKLY MAIL story. One would have thought that, you know, the principle of audi alteram partem is basic, you know, to fairness in journalism. But he never, what you call—the story was just published without giving me ...

[Bishop, interrupting] You mean that's the Latin tag: all sides in fairness?

[Buthelezi] Quite so.

[Bishop] So he never approached you?

[Buthelezi] He never, he never, he never does. In fact they never approach us.

[Bishop] I suppose he would argue that if he did he might get an indictment slapped on it, wouldn't he?

[Buthelezi] Indictment by who?

[Bishop] Well I don't know. Maybe you, or the police, or both combined.

[Buthelezi] No, I really ...

[Bishop, interrupting] Sorry I have to sort of work for and against Anton Harber at the same time [words indistinct], but anyway ...

[Du Preez] Well the chief minister is well known in our circles as being a very enthusiastic litigator.

[Buthelezi] Well the law protects me. I have rights like anybody else. I mean, I realize that as a public man I am fair game, but when people go on then to make imputations about my character, about my family, and so on, then you know, my only remedy is to go to court. The fact is you don't like it, but it is my right.

[Bishop] Max du Preez can I use you in lieu of Anton Harber? Would you as an editor publish a story which had not been checked out, one; and two, would you publish a story if you hadn't made reference to the people you are making allegations against? Would you do that?

[Du Preez] Well, the basic rule, and I'm sure that is true also of the WEEKLY MAIL, is that when you have a story, let the other side speak. We have done, in my own case, in my newspaper's case, we have done the same thing as the WEEKLY MAIL has done now—in the case of the Civil Cooperation Bureau—these murder squads—where you know there is a great chance of the man, or the institution

that you are writing about, getting an interdict like happened now with the SUNDAY TIMES and Mr. (Buti Palozolo) where you can be silenced.

[Bishop] OK. So you just go with it then...

[Du Preez] Mr. Harber knew. He knew that Chief Buthelezi would get a fair hearing, that he would be on television, that every newspaper in the world would take it up, and that we would all run to Mr. Buthelezi and he would have a fair chance to state his case, as he is. [general interruption]

[Bishop] Let's hear you Shaun.

[Johnson] Back onto the issue of the WEEKLY MAIL. I understand, I think, why perhaps the chief minister has had such harsh words for that newspaper. But I would like to ask him—does he not feel that this newspaper has performed its duty rather courageously, and rather well in unearthing a document of this sort, because surely the chief minister is as appalled as we are that such money was being channeled in, and that such shenanigans were taking place. Does he not feel that the WEEKLY MAIL has performed rather well...

[Buthelezi, interrupting] I think that's completely irrelevant, because here I am talking about the practice, you know, of your fraternity. As Mr. du Preez has just said that it is only right that when you write something about someone, that you consult that person. I mean, for instance, I don't see—know whether you think what Maj. Botha said is gospel truth because he is white like you—I don't know—and because I am black; because there is a culture of that among you. Because I don't see that the evidence of just one person—what someone was writing, you know, perhaps to impress his superiors—should be thrown at me as if it's gospel truth, and it isn't.

[Johnson] But the minister of law and order himself is confirming it, Chief Minister...

[Buthelezi, interrupting] Confirming? Was he present when I was talking?

[Johnson] No he was confirming the involvement of Maj. Botha who he says is an honorable man, and I certainly...

[Buthelezi, interrupting] I suppose I am not honorable because I am black?

[Johnson] No, that's certainly not my implication, I think it's an appalling implication.

[Bishop] Alright. Do you have another question, Shaun Johnson? I'll tell you why, because we have got about four minutes left, and part of our mandate, before the story ever broke, was to talk about the conference which has just ended. We must, I think, use some of that time to do that. So, gentlemen, I don't want to be seen to be a censor, but would you agree that you are here for a second purpose as well?

[Johnson] Yes, certainly. I have a very brief one, unless Len would like to?

[Bishop] OK.

[Johnson] I would like to ask the chief minister, and the people present—there seems to have been a very clear decision against the patriotic front approach. Perhaps they could explain that to us, because it is going to have a direct effect on the way the process unfolds.

[Bishop] Could I just leave the chief minister alone for a minute. Which of you gentlemen would...

[Buthelezi, interrupting] I think that Mr. Felgate has already indicated that he wanted to speak.

[Bishop] Mr. Felgate. The patriotic front—you've done away with the idea of the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress], the ANC, and Inkatha getting together in a patriotic front. You've done away with that, have you?

[Felgate] We say very simply that a patriotic front bringing together the ANC together with the IFP, and the PAC would have been real politics 10 years ago, and in all probability we would have been very glad to participate. Today it's yesterday's politics. Today [words indistinct] mounting up against whites, and that is just not our [word indistinct].

[Bishop] Very briefly, and a quick response. So what are you going to do in the future then? What's your next game plan?

[Felgate] We are going to discuss the matter with the PAC later in August, and also have discussions with the ANC. Time is going to be spent in that way.

[Bishop] Floor Manager David Yates tells me one minute, gentlemen. So let's have it quick.

[Maseko] As a followup to Mr. Felgate, are you saying that there was no covert alliance between Inkatha and the government?

[Felgate] I am saying quite emphatically there was no covert alliance between the South African...

[Buthelezi, interrupting] Alliance?

[Bishop] Alliance, he said.

[Buthelezi] What alliance? What does he mean?

[Bishop] He asks if there was a covert, a secret alliance between you and the government to do things.

[Buthelezi] Such as?

[Bishop] Well, he hasn't spelt that out. Very quickly, Mr. Maseko. What is this alliance designed to do?

[Maseko] As they say, the alliance was to, sort of, prop up the pro-sanctions, the anti-sanctions campaign.

[Bishop] But they are anti-sanctions. They said it openly, the Inkatha Freedom Party. So why would they have to go into an alliance for that, covertly, secretly?

[Maseko] That has happened, because the money was deposited in an account, and no one wanted to say where it came from, and no one...

[Bishop, interrupting] Ahh, but that was done by the security police. That's admitted to by the minister. But the chief minister here says he knows nothing about it.

[Maseko] But he has accounted for it, according to Mr....

[Felgate, interrupting] And also an alliance is something that you work out between leaders. The IFP leaders knew nothing about this, how could there be an alliance to it?

[Bishop] Sorry Mr. [Name indistinct]. I have got one question now, because I am sorry you haven't been able to participate as much as we hoped you would, Dr. Frank Mdlalose. You are alleged—you and Dr. Oscar Dhlomo, to have been disaffected with your chief minister. Now obviously you are sitting next to him. What's the story here?

[Mdlalose] Well, I'm just appalled. I'm surprised at it all. I've always known the chief minister for many, many years. I've known him from 1950...

[Bishop, interrupting] So it's not true?

[Mdlalose] It's untrue!

[Bishop] A quick one from our journalists. You've got 10 seconds.

[Maseko] I would like to know what Inkatha is planning to do now to repair the damage to its image and the name?

[Bishop] Right. Allegation is your image had been damaged...

[Felgate, interrupting] Investigate the matter for ourselves.

[Bishop] Investigate the matter. And the last word, Chief Minister. This has been your show. You've been under attack here as well. What are you going to do?

[Buthelezi] Damage, I mean, like beauty...

[Bishop, interrupting] Repair the damage?

[Buthelezi, continuing] ...that is in the eye of the beholder, like beauty. I think the damage you are talking about is in your eyes, Mr. Maseko.

[Bishop] Well, thank you...

[Maseko, interrupting] But do you say you are appalled by the damage that has been done to you and Inkatha?

[Buthelezi] Done?

[Bishop] Are you appalled by the damage done to Inkatha? We've really got to get out of this, chaps.

[Buthelezi] Well, the damage that you imagine, I say that is in your eyes.

[Bishop] You are imagining things, according to the chief minister, Mr. Maseko. Let's carry this on in our homes because we have got to go back. The show is not closed yet, and we are returning to Callie Long in Johannesburg, and thank you all very much, up there and down here. Thank you Chief Minister, and everyone. Thank you.

### 23 Jul Press Review on Current Events

MB2307125391

[Editorial Report]

#### THE CITIZEN

Inkatha Funding Disclosures 'Well-Timed'—Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English on 22 July in its page 6 editorial says "interestingly enough" the allegations of rally payments to Inkatha and train massacres "came on the eve of Inkatha's congress and as Mr Mandela was about to start a new tour abroad calling for sanctions to be reimposed. Thus, the disclosures were well-timed." "Mr de Klerk has shown in his handling of his reform programme, and his repeal of apartheid laws, that he is a man of his word. He must make candid disclosures on all the issues that have been raised—and others that might still be published."

#### THE STAR

ANC 'Remarkably Measured' To State Funds Disclosures—"The uncontested proof that State funds were channelled via the SA [South African] Police to Inkatha and its labour adjunct, UWUSA [United Workers Union of South Africa], is deeply damaging—and, as a corollary, strengthens the ANC's case in demanding an interim government to ensure neutrality during transition," points out the page 18 editorial in Johannesburg THE STAR in English on 23 July. The ANC has been "remarkably measured in its response to the revelations—it does not want, according to its leaders, to threaten either the anti-violence initiatives or the negotiating process." Nevertheless, President de Klerk "faces some very tough choices. Heads must surely roll, but he has some latitude in how he goes about the exercise. The summary sacking of Minister Vlok (with General Malan and even Pik Botha not far behind?) would probably do it, but this is most unlikely. He could shift Mr Vlok to another portfolio, and that might help. But at the very least, he should institute an urgent and uncircumscribed commission of inquiry into all the allegations—more will certainly be forthcoming—and he should bind himself to acting upon its recommendations." "Mr de Klerk has to reassure his own people as well as the international community. It is his most urgent task, and he must succeed in it. Because if he fails, we as a people will have failed to grasp a historic opportunity for redemption."

#### BUSINESS DAY

De Klerk Must Limit Secret Funds Scandal Damage—"President de Klerk's immediate concern about the Inkatha funding scandal has to be damage limitation, not simply for himself and his Cabinet but for South Africa as a whole," notes a page 8 editorial in Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 23 July. South Africans "need to be concerned about Buthelezi and Inkatha" because they have the "indisputable ability to put impis [warriors] on the streets." The "taunt" of the secret payments to Inkatha "appears to run deeply through the Cabinet and the question of De Klerk's own involvement must inevitably be raised. For the present, a cynical expediency might dictate that the President's involvement is not probed too deeply—the success of the negotiating progress depends heavily on him personally and his relationship with Nelson Mandela and other leaders. But that does not mean full disclosure of the secret funds is not required."

#### SOWETAN

Call for State Action Against Right-Wing Violence—Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on 23 July in a page 8 editorial says there are "just too many incidents involving rightwingers who refuse to adapt to the changing times. It is therefore now about time that the Government used the same might it has been too willing to use on blacks to stop this intolerance before it goes too far. It is just not acceptable that Hillview High School in Pretoria should be bombed twice in one week seemingly because it had been earmarked for children of ANC cadres returning from Tanzania."

#### CITY PRESS

Buthelezi's Only Option To Join National Party—Inkatha's Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi "is fighting for his political life" after exposure of "his covert operations at the behest of his ally, the National Party [NP] Government," declares a page 8 editorial in Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English on 21 July. "Buthelezi's only option is to openly join the NP. If he does not do this, he must quit as KwaZulu's Chief Minister and Minister of Police. Buthelezi's double agenda as anti-apartheid protester and leading supporter of the system has severely discredited him here and in the West."

### 24 Jul Press Review

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[Editorial Report]

#### THE STAR

Sense of 'Betrayal' Over Secret Fundings—Referring to the disclosure of secret government funds deposited in Inkatha bank accounts, Johannesburg THE STAR in English on 24 July in a page 16 editorial says: "Instead of concentrating on the crucial issues, the Cabinet is huddled in a bosberaad [bush summit] trying to find ways of minimising the consequences of its own immorality."



"Worst of all, millions of moderate South Africans who had cautiously brought themselves to hope that perhaps, at last, the country had a government of integrity and honesty, have had their illusions shattered. There is a sense of anger and betrayal. Only a fool would blame the messenger for all these problems. It is the corruption that is the crime, not the exposure of it. And the country better be grateful that it has come out now rather than later."

#### BUSINESS DAY

Call for Foreign Minister's Resignation—Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 24 July in a page 8 editorial notes that Foreign Minister Pik Botha "angrily rejected a suggestion that the government had funded Inkatha" at a press conference following the departure of his Australian counterpart. Pik Botha's "lie" has "only now been uncovered by Botha's own admission that he authorised the secret use of state funds to finance Inkatha rallies." "We now have a Foreign Minister who can swear, hand on heart, that something is true, or totally untrue, and not be believed domestically or internationally. He has but one honourable course, and should resign at today's Cabinet meeting."

#### SOWETAN

De Klerk Must Move on Funds for Inkatha Disclosures—"President de Klerk must make some dramatic and speedy moves if he is to survive the funds-for-Inkatha scandal," declares a page 8 editorial in Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on 24 July. "For members of his own Cabinet to say they knew nothing about it when they did is bad enough. For the President to do nothing about that is even worse."

Inkatha Unlikely To Join Patriotic Front—A second editorial on the same page believes it is unlikely the Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP] will be involved in the "Patriotic Front" of the African National Congress, ANC, the Pan-Africanist Congress, PAC, and other organizations which is due to be launched in August. The disclosures that Inkatha has secretly been accepting government funds for its rallies have "badly dented" its image as an independent political force. "There is danger in this because clashes between IFP and non-IFP supporters have already led to thousands of deaths. The agonising prospect, if it is to be the Government and the IFP against the 'Patriotic Front', is that there are still going to be many more deaths."

#### TIMES OF NAMIBIA

Criticism of Government's Hosting of Marxist-Leninist Leaders—Windhoek TIMES OF NAMIBIA in English on 17 July in a page 2 editorial states: "By ignoring the leaders of democratic parties in neighboring countries, our government not only runs the risk to start off on a bad footing with tomorrow's leaders but the hosting of Marxist-Leninist opposition parties from democratic and market-oriented states tells us a lot about the governing party. It was not by accident that SWAPO

[South-West African People's Organization] head and chief coordinator Moses Garoeb chose a campaign meeting of UNIP [United National Independence Party]—where socialism and political intolerance is camouflaged as 'humanism'—to have put his ideal for Namibia as a one-party state."

#### \* Labor Unions Hold National Congresses

##### \* NUMSA Members Increase

91AF1254A Johannesburg THE NEW NATION in English 21-27 Jun 91 p 21

[Text] Cosatu's [Congress of South African Trade Unions] National Union of Metal Workers (Numsa) began its third national congress in Johannesburg yesterday. Having doubled its membership since the last congress two years ago, Numsa is technically Cosatu's biggest affiliate. It claims a membership of 286,393, compared to the National Union of Mineworkers' 270,000 paid members at the time of its national congress in April. NUM's signed up membership is, however, around 360,000. Debates at the congress are expected to focus on four major themes, including economic restructuring, destroying apartheid and building democracy, union constitutional matters and an assessment of union structures.

##### \* NUMSA on Negotiations

91AF1254B Johannesburg THE NEW NATION in English 4 Jul 91 p 12

[Text] Dissatisfaction with the way the ANC [African National Congress] has been conducting pre-negotiations talks and the lack of consultation in key decisions prompted metalworkers to support a Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] proposal for indirect participation in talks about talks.

Participation should be through Cosatu representatives in the ANC delegation at the talks, the National Union of Metalworkers (Numsa) decided at its national congress last weekend.

Numsa general secretary Moses Mayekiso said in his report to the union's third national congress in Johannesburg at the weekend that, in terms of the Organisation of African Unity's Harare Declaration, the negotiations process envisaged four steps, including talks about preconditions, negotiations towards an interim government, which in turn would supervise election for a constituent assembly and finally the drafting of a new constitution.

It was on the basis of this programme that Numsa supported Cosatu's proposal not to be party to the pre-conditions talks.

But there has since been concern in Cosatu that the pre-conditions talks were in fact covering a wider spectrum of issues than that laid down in the Harare Declaration.

**Surprise**

"The suspension of armed struggle during pre-conditions talks caught us by surprise," Mayekiso said in his report.

"It appeared as if important decisions that were outside the Harare framework were being taken without sufficient consultation both with ANC rank and file members and the Alliance partners," he added.

This much was acknowledged by ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela in his address to the Numsa congress. He, however, gave delegates the assurance that corrective measures were being taken.

Mayekiso also warned that National Party leader F.W. de Klerk wanted an All-Party Conference (APC), rather than a democratically elected constituent assembly, to decide on a new constitution.

The APC is also seen as a vehicle to strengthen interests allied to capital and apartheid.

Numsa warned that if such a scheme succeeded, "the position of the working class will be severely threatened."

"Because of these concerns, Cosatu has proposed that it should be an indirect part of negotiations in the form of having representatives in the ANC negotiating teams." Numsa says it will support this position.

**Consultation**

It is envisaged that an Alliance Forum, which will formulate a position on issues being negotiated, will receive reports from the negotiating team and give fresh mandates to the team. This will no doubt strengthen and widen the process of consultation and report back. And if successful, it will address one of the major shortcomings of the negotiations process and eliminate a major source of discontent with progress thus far.

Numsa's decision comes at a crucial time in the build-up to constitutional talks and will almost certainly have an impact on the ANC's National Conference next week.

The Alliance Forum will be made up of executive members of each of the alliance partners.

At the same time, the union emphasised the importance of political autonomy and said Cosatu should retain its independence and reserve the right to put forward its own positions outside of negotiations.

Union officials should nevertheless be free to belong to any political party of their choice. It, however, makes a crucial qualification to this position and says the union will not allow officials and members to form party political blocs in the union.

**Mandates**

Union staff and officials, when carrying out Numsa work, will have to strictly adhere to union mandates.

Staff members that are approached to become involved in political organisations will also have to carefully assess whether such involvement would have any adverse impact on the union or not.

Numsa's position effectively sanctions Mayekiso's position on the national Interim Leadership Group of the SACP [South African Communist Party] with certain provisions.

With NUM [National Union of Mineworkers] having adopted a similar position on the many hats debate, it is almost certain that Cosatu's national congress late next month will decide on qualified support for multi-organisational and political party leadership.

Numsa and NUM represent by far the majority in Cosatu. This majority will be enhanced by Fawu [Food and Allied Workers' Union] and Ppwawu [Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union].

The union has also set itself on a path to deal severely with corruption in the union. It also makes reference to shop stewards refusing to accept union discipline and staff caucusing against Numsa structures. Although the report does not specify, the comment seems partly directed at Mercedes Benz workers, who went on strike against union advice.

Theft of funds has also occurred, the union says in its report.

**\* SACTWU Resolutions**

91AF1254C Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 21-27 Jun 91 p 12

[Text] COSATU's [Congress of South African Trade Unions'] South African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union (Sactwu) last week became the federation's first affiliate to endorse the closed shop principle.

The decision was taken at its national congress in Cape Town.

Closed shops have been the subject of substantial debate in the labour movement recently and positions have varied from qualified support to outright rejection of the concept.

Sactwu's endorsement is certain to spur the debate on. The union said in its resolution that it will resist state and employer efforts to undermine the closed shop principle. It said it would also campaign to have the closed shop extended to all unionised factories.

But opposition is not limited to the bosses and the state. Some unions have also attacked it on the basis that it is likely to compromise democratic practices in the union.

Much of the opposition from democratic unions to the closed shop is, however, based on the history of closed shop agreements in South Africa and the fact that they were used to suppress the growth of the progressive labour movement.

Closed shops were also used to exclude black workers from certain skilled jobs.

### Restricted

But when the democratic labour movement grew, despite the protection afforded to the racial unions, the government amended the Labour Relations Act (LRA) in 1988 and effectively restricted closed shops.

The majority of unions were unable to demand sole bargaining rights and the recognition of minority unions was encouraged. This clause has since been scrapped from the LRA following massive worker resistance.

But resistance to closed shops from democratic unions is not only limited to the history of the practice.

### Criticised

One of the unions which have criticised closed shop agreements as undemocratic is the Food and Allied Workers Union (Fawu).

The food union has opted for agreements which would give it sole bargaining rights with companies where it has a majority membership. Minority unions would not, in terms of the agreement, be allowed to negotiate wages and working conditions.

This means that if the union loses its majority status, it would hand over bargaining rights to the succeeding union. This would ensure that the union earns its right to represent workers in any particular factory.

Unions also argue that agreements which impose membership on workers militate against the principle of freedom of association. It also has the potential to render unions complacent because they would be guaranteed membership irrespective of whether they serve the interests of workers or not.

### Defunct

Examples of unions affiliated to the now defunct Trade Union Council of SA (Tucsa) are cited in support of this argument.

Sactwu, however, does not envisage enforcing the closed shop principle industry wide and in factories that are not unionised. It says in its resolution that it will campaign for all unionised factories to be included in the closed shop.

And in factories where it has a majority and a closed shop agreement is secured, new workers entering a factory will have to join the union within two weeks of working for that particular employer.

Although the resolution in support of the closed shop was only adopted last week, Sactwu had tabled the demand at negotiations last year.

### Alternative

As an alternative, the union has demanded higher increases for union members as opposed to non-union members.

Alongside the resolution on closed shops, the union also committed itself to a programme geared towards building a single national industrial council for the clothing sector.

As far as the textile industry was concerned, the union said it would consider a national strike if bosses opposed the establishment of a national industrial council.

The Sactwu congress also decided to call for a review of sanctions at a conference of Cosatu and its allies on the subject. It is, however, envisaged that investment would be governed by an investment code that would lay down standards for multinationals operating in the country.

The resolution says that any lifting of sanctions will have to be tied to social clauses in agreements covering basic trade union rights.

It will also launch an organising drive to include farm workers in the cotton and wool sectors in Sactwu.

The congress also resolved to form links with workers in Swaziland and Lesotho and to explore with them the desirability of their inclusion in Sactwu.

### \* Left Challenges SACTWU

91AF1254D Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 16-20 Jun 91 p 16

[Article by Drew Forrest]

[Text] COSATU's [Congress of South African Trade Unions'] third largest affiliate—the South African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union [SACTWU]—is facing a challenge from the radical left on its alleged "reformism" and lack of worker control.

Last month saw the launch in the Western Cape of a "campaign for a militant Sactwu," backed by the Marxist Workers' Tendency [MWT] of the African National Congress, a Trotskyist group.

Sactwu is a particular bugbear of the MWT, which devoted an entire recent issue of its journal to an attack on the union's national minimum wage stance.

MWT member Tom Adams said the campaign had worker support in up to 20 Western Cape factories and there were moves afoot to extend it into other areas.

He claimed Sactwu leaders had reacted by threatening to raise MWT infiltration of the unions with Cosatu as a whole.

"They've declared war on us," he said.

Among workers' complaints Adams alleged, were official inactivity on dismissals and the fact that the union's



minimum wage policy had not been canvassed with members. The MWT is pressing for a R[and]250-a-week statutory minimum, while key Sactwu leaders hold minima should be set in bargaining.

Workers were also angry at wage deals clinched last year in the Cape cotton textile sector, and could not accept demands that politics be kept out of the union.

Reacting, Sactwu's Ebrahim Patel said 12 workers had attended last month's meeting to elect a campaign steering committee, in a Sactwu region of 68,000 members.

"Our main concern is the way in which outside groups relate to our constitutional structures and independence," he said.

"The principle must be that members take decisions."

### \* SAMWU Wage Policy

91AF1254E Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 14-20 Jun 91 p 16

[Text] Cosatu's [Congress of South African Trade Unions'] 70,000-strong South African Municipal Workers' Union [SAMWU] has vowed to restructure municipal wages as part of a living wage policy.

At its recent national congress in Cape Town, Samwu noted huge differentials between wages for the same job in different municipalities and the lack of a consistent wage structure in councils with the same municipal grading. In response, it said it was co-ordinating negotiations nationally for the first time.

### \* FAWU Resolutions

91AF1254F Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 14-20 Jun 91 p 16

[Article by Dick Usher and Elnews]

[Text] The 130,000-member Food and Allied Workers' Union [FAWU] has fully supported as a democratic right the wearing of "many hats" by union leaders.

The position, adopted at Fawu's national congress last week in Umtata, holds that there is "absolutely nothing wrong" with worker leaders being elected to posts in other progressive organisations which advance worker interests.

The wearing of many hats—and, specifically, overlapping leadership of the Congress of South African Trade Unions [COSATU] and its allies, the African National Congress [ANC] and the South African Communist Party [SACP]—is a hot issue and will be aired at Cosatu's July national congress. While some affiliates hold that dual leadership threatens union independence, Fawu has traditionally identified closely with the congress movement.

Also at its congress, Fawu adopted a comprehensive policy on Aids—becoming the first union in the country to do so.

Among other features, the policy demands negotiated Aids agreements with employers, aimed at combating fear and prejudice, and a ban on discrimination against or dismissal of infected workers. (For full details, see THE WEEKLY MAIL 24-29 May.)

The congress also called for an economy based on socialist principles, saying socialism had not failed but that Eastern bloc leaders had departed from Marxist-Leninist theory.

Delegates also resolved that the Cosatu national congress should not adopt an economic policy, but that this should be done at a special conference once the relevant documents had been translated and circulated among workers.

### \* PPWAWU Membership

91AF1254G Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 21-27 Jun 91 p 12

[Text] Strikes involving Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union (Ppwawu) members in the past two years cost the paper, printing, pulp and wood industry almost a quarter-million workdays, according to the union's biennial report.

An analysis of the strikes showed that the union had achieved a greater degree of co-ordination and control at a national and regional level, although problems with co-ordination still existed, the report said.

### Focus

And this will certainly form an important part of the union's focus in the next two years, especially in the context of the growth in membership.

Ppwawu's biennial report said membership had increased by at least 30 percent since its last national congress in 1989.

The biggest growth, according to union figures, occurred in the forestry and saw-milling sector, where membership increased from about 5,500 to just over 11,500.

Combined with increases in other sectors, this helped increase membership from 32,500 in 1989 to almost 42,500.

According to Ppwawu general secretary, Sipho Kubheka, the emphasis throughout the congress was on participatory democracy and this was reflected in the manner in which resolutions were drafted.

### Commissions

Delegates from regions broke up into commissions and drafted resolutions during congress. Normally resolutions are submitted by different regions for debate and adoption at congress.

Kubheka says the resolutions may be adopted at a special national congress.

Sakhela Buhlugu was elected assistant general secretary at the congress.

### \* CWIU Position

91AF1254H Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 21-27 Jun 91 p 12

[Text] The Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (CWIU) have decided against union leaders and full-time officials holding positions in political parties.

Its position against unionists holding offices in political party structures comes at a time when a number of other Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] unions have expressed support for dual leadership.

According to the CWIU resolution adopted at its biennial national congress last weekend, national office bearers and full-time officials in the union and Cosatu, could not "wear two hats."

Cosatu assistant general secretary, Sydney Mufamadi, and its first vice president, Chris Dlamini, currently hold positions in the SACP's [South African Communist Party's] national leadership.

Moses Mayekiso, general secretary of Numsa [National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa], is also in the Party's national leadership.

The National Union of Mineworkers [NUM], the Food and Allied Workers' Union [FAWU] and the Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers' Union [PPWAWU] are among the unions which support dual leadership.

The congress also resolved that a future South African economy should have a socialist orientation and that economic restructuring should be assisted by the nationalisation of conglomerates.

### \* SACCAWU Resolutions

91AF1254I Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 4 Jul 91 p 12

[Text] Political debate centred around trade union independence, multi-party leadership and general policy dominated the past weekend's SA Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (Saccawu) third national congress.

All in all, there were no less than 15 resolutions dealing with issues around the tripartite alliance, political policy, dual leadership and the constituent assembly and interim government tabled at the congress.

On balance, this is more than during any previous congress of the union.

### Underscores

The trend is not unique to Saccawu and in fact underscores the importance with which the labour movement currently views developments on the political front.

While there were no major surprises in the resolutions adopted, delegates emerged from congress with what seems a compromise resolution on the question of dual leadership.

There was strong argument against dual leadership, but equally strong support for union leaders holding positions in party political structures.

### Dual Leadership

It was therefore not surprising that delegates voted in support of dual leadership in the case of all officials except for the key post of general secretary.

Saccawu cautions, however, that dual leadership can in some cases affect the efficiency of the union and result in problems of accountability. It would be up to the union, therefore, to ensure that this does not happen and to rectify the problem whenever it occurs.

It also resolved that general membership should be encouraged to participate fully in political organisations.

On the tripartite alliance, debate focused on why the partnership should not be expanded to include other political formations.

A number of Saccawu officials have in the past expressed a desire to see the tripartite alliance being broadened to include formations like the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress], Wosa [Workers Organisation for Socialist Action] and Azapo [Azanian People's Organization].

### Discussed

Some officials also pointed out that, while they are not opposed to political alliances, these must be thoroughly discussed with membership.

While it is believed resolutions on defining a general political policy for the union may have been tabled, it appears none were adopted.

A view held in the union is for it not to have a political policy which would divide the union.

Following the split in the union in 1987, Saccawu has been particularly cautious on issues of political policy.

### Recruitment

In his report, Papi Kganare, who replaces Vivian Mtwa as general secretary of the union, placed particular emphasis on the need for a more aggressive recruitment drive.

He pointed out that Saccawu membership currently stands at 90,000. This represents only 10.3 percent of the total combined workforce of about 873,000 in the sectors organised by the union.

In OK Bazaars, for example, the union represents only 10,000 of a total of 22,000 non-managerial staff.

### \* Expansion of Regional Water Projects Envisaged

91AF1253A Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS*  
in English: 7 Jun 91 pp 31-32, 42, 44, 46

[Interview with Paul Roberts, managing engineer, Department of Water Affairs, by Jill Stanford; place and date not given]

[Text] Final agreement is soon to be reached between South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique on the development of the Komati river which will see the construction of South Africa's next dam, Driekoppies. So says Dr. Paul Roberts, managing engineer (planning) at the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, in an interview with *THE ENGINEERING NEWS*. A scheme on the Limpopo together with Botswana could be next on the cards. These moves are an indication of the improving southern African political climate in which it is going to be easier to implement joint water projects.

[Question] How will the new South Africa's improved relations with neighbouring territories affect water supplies?

[Answer] With the improving political climate it is going to be much easier to implement water projects, specifically joint water projects.

We are involved in several such projects: the Lesotho Highlands Water Project is on the go, the Komati river development is impending and later on there may well be a scheme on the Limpopo in conjunction with Botswana.

### Komati Discussions

We are holding further discussions soon with Swaziland and Mozambique concerning the Komati river development and we are getting pretty close now to the final agreement.

In the first phase of the Komati river development two dams are to be constructed—the Driekoppies dam in South Africa and the Maguga dam in Swaziland.

These two form part of a system of dams which will also have an impact on Mozambique as a downstream country and obviously its requirements are being taken into account.

[Question] Are any steps being taken to establish a water policy for the southern African region?

[Answer] We have various mechanisms whereby we have consultation on a bilateral or a multilateral basis between countries.

### Water Commissions

These mechanisms include the permanent water commissions between South Africa, the self governing territories and the independent territories and the joint permanent technical commissions formed with neighbouring countries.

Each country has its own water policy, but in the process of this type of consultation one begins to generate a uniformity of approach, which tends to be assisted by other organisations such as the World Bank and the Development Bank.

We have always had, from a technical point of view, good relationships with our neighbouring countries—even before there were political discussions with Mozambique there was discussion on a technical level for example.

We have always given Mozambique flood warnings to assist it with necessary preparations in lieu of an impending flood from the Pongolapoort dam and other rivers.

[Question] What water projects are being planned in South Africa and the southern African region and is any involvement by the World Bank envisaged?

[Answer] Recently we had representatives from the World Bank looking at the question of urban services in South Africa of which water supplies and sanitation are very important.

### World Bank Funding

It would appear that the bank is very interested in cooperating with the department on various studies and it may be possible that within a couple of years it will fund certain projects.

The World Bank is an important player in the Lesotho project; in fact we had representatives in Washington last week to discuss the question of financing.

A joint project with the World Bank to study water resources management methodology for the whole southern African region is also getting off the ground.

The project will look at ways and means of developing common water resources.

So there is contact with the World Bank and we hope that there will be further contact in the future.

[Question] What impact is urbanisation likely to have on the South African water situation?

[Answer] One positive side of urbanisation is that it is much easier and much cheaper to distribute water because of the concentration of the population.

Of course the treatment of effluent is also easier.

### Rise in Pollution

When you have an informal type of urban situation, however, where services are poor or even non-existent as in the case of the squatting type community, one gets a rise in pollution with the attendant poor health conditions.

The department recently submitted a draft policy to the President's Council on the question of urbanisation, with particular reference to our field of interest which is water supply and sanitation, pointing out the various problems with urbanisation.

One wants to provide a certain minimum basic quantity of water for survival and health for example; but the question arises how to implement the scheme, how to fund it, how to operate it and at the end of the day the running costs and the recovery thereof.

[Question] How much water is consumed in South Africa each year and at what rate is this consumption likely to grow between now and the year 2010?

[Answer] If we take all the consumer sectors, including irrigation and the indirect use of forestry (as forestry intercepts the runoff), we are using 19,000 million m<sup>3</sup> of water a year.

We estimate that in 2010 water consumption will grow to about 26,000 million m<sup>3</sup>, which is a growth rate of about 3.5 percent a year.

Growth will be higher in the urban industrial sector than in irrigation as this sector already has a very large base.

### Sufficient Produce

There will be a slight growth in irrigation but at the moment we have sufficient agricultural produce and further can also be produced under dry land conditions.

[Question] What is the capacity of water available in South Africa from both surface and underground sources?

[Answer] The mean annual runoff of all of our rivers is 54,000 million m<sup>3</sup> a year of which we can exploit 33,000 million m<sup>3</sup>.

We estimate that we can exploit 5,400 million m<sup>3</sup> of underground water a year.

In 1980 the use of underground water was about 1,800 million m<sup>3</sup>.

The total capacity of our storage dams is about 28,000 million m<sup>3</sup> which is slightly more than half of the total mean annual runoff.

Due to the highly variable nature of the flow in this country we normally have to have in any particular river system something between one and one-and-a-half and

even up to two times the mean annual runoff to generate an economical exploitable quantity of water.

### Potential Development

When you consider that the capacity of our dams is about half of the mean annual runoff, there is still a lot of potential for further development of dams.

One of the problems is that there is in certain instances a shortage of suitable dam sites from a physical and geological point of view.

The second constraint is the social environment—we are having increasing difficulty finding a dam site because the area is often highly populated.

Finally, often the sites chosen are in fairly remote regions which are protected or in such a state that they are not available from an environmental point of view.

[Question] When will South Africa begin to build its next dam?

[Answer] The Driekoppies dam is lined up and that should begin fairly soon.

### Dams Proposed for Cape

The next area which we will probably have to concentrate on is in the western Cape where there are some dams proposed for the supplementation of the Theewaterskloof dam and Berg river schemes.

There are other proposals which are being weighed up, including further phases of the Palmiet river scheme for example.

[Question] Groundwater consumption has been growing steadily. What aquifers are available for exploitation and what impact is the large number of private boreholes having on the water table?

[Answer] According to the latest questionnaires that were sent out to municipalities and agricultural offices, there was no growth in groundwater abstraction for irrigation.

The reasons are the increasing cost of electricity, the lower prices for agricultural products, and the decline in groundwater resources in areas such as Dendron, Grootfontein and the Crocodile river.

However there was an increase in groundwater abstraction in the granite of the Coetzersdam/Louwina/Vryburg area and the dolomite of the Koster/Marico area.

### Groundwater for Cities

There has been a slight increase in urban water supply from groundwater sources over the past five years.

For example, Pietersburg relies quite heavily on groundwater during droughts and Potgietersrust was almost entirely dependent on groundwater during the recent drought period.



De Aar has an extensive groundwater scheme while Pretoria-Rietvlei dolomite has had a new scheme in operation for about two years.

At Bitterfontein there is a project on the go to desalinate brackish groundwater and there has been an overall increase in Walvis Bay abstraction, but depletion of resources in the Kuseb river alluvium necessitates a 25 percent cut back in groundwater consumption.

Although there are additional groundwater reserves in the Kuseb delta these are not recharged and their exploitation would have a significant environmental impact due to the encroachment of the saline wedge.

Other urban water supply areas include the Klein Karoo rural groundwater supply scheme in the Dysselsdorp area in Oudtshoorn, Jeffreys Bay and Pomfret.

Groundwater resources/aquifers not fully utilised include the Cape Folded belt—TMS, but extensive development and exploration in this area will reduce the low flow of rivers and streams; and the Ghaap plateau-dolomite where there is limited potential for development due to lack of irrigable land and no urban demand at present.

The dolomite of Bapsfontein Delmas is being partially exploited for irrigation while the exploitation of the dolomite of the Ventersdorp-Koster-Marico region will affect the flow of springs.

Springs in the Turffontein dolomite compartment are being used for irrigation (Gerhard Minnebron) and pumpage of groundwater will also affect the flow of these springs.

The groundwater table rises during periods of above average rainfall and recedes during periods of low rainfall.

Extensive pumpage for irrigation, for example, would cause an additional decline of groundwater, as would any other private abstraction but with lesser impact if the abstraction rates are small.

Private boreholes have the most marked effect in cities such as Pretoria where the density of groundwater abstraction for gardening is high.

Excessive depletion of the groundwater has however caused boreholes to run dry which has led to a reduced total abstraction in a self controlling way.

The same applies in any area of groundwater over-exploitation where the excessive drop in the water level becomes a counter-balancing factor by reducing the total abstraction.

[Question] What standards are universal with regard to water quality and to what extent does South African water conform to these standards?

[Answer] The South African Bureau of Standards Specification for water for domestic supplies (SABS 241-1984) is adopted countrywide as the norm for urban water supplies and is generally applied by government, all water boards, local authorities and industry.

By and large most water supplies in South Africa comply with SABS specification most of the time.

However, in some rural areas some of the inland smaller local authorities situated in the central and western regions of the country, the prescribed limits for some of the more controversial determinants such as flourides are exceeded.

### **Expenditure Unjustified**

The high expenditure of removing these impurities purely from a health point of view in these areas is thought to be unjustified.

[Question] Could you describe the so-called Helsinki rules with regard to downstream water rights and relate any instances in which these have had to be evoked in the southern African region?

[Answer] The Helsinki rules were promulgated by the International Law Association in Helsinki in 1966 and they underlie all of our thinking with regard to interstate joint development and sharing of resources.

The rules themselves are very flexible but they give key issues which have to be looked at.

One of the important aspects in sharing a water resource is the question of reasonable equitable share of the basin resource.

There are many relevant factors which are taken into account when determining what reasonable use is: factors such as geography of the basin, the hydrology, climate, past utilisation, economic and social needs, the population size, availability of other resources, costs and so on.

### **Negotiation Checklist**

The Helsinki rules are not a formula as such, but more of a checklist to see what to take into account when negotiation between the parties takes place.

What is also of importance is that there is no permanent allocation of say 40 percent of the water for South Africa and 60 percent for the downstream state.

It is a moving target and one has the opportunity of reevaluating the situation from time to time depending on current needs.

One case where we are using the rules comes to mind; the question of the Sabi river incorporated in the Komati development for which we are having discussions with Mozambique on Friday.

[Question] We have seen South Africa's plans to obtain additional water supplies from Lesotho. What are the other potential southern African sources and is there a chance of water being obtained from the Okavango?

[Answer] I understand that the Okavango is not viable at all due to the distances involved.

Another source which has been studied by overseas consultants is the Zambezi river but this is still very long term in that we have the Lesotho scheme which should keep the PWV [Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging] area going until at least 2030.

Then there is the sea, but the big problem with this source is the very high cost of desalination.

We are looking to apply desalination in Cape Town in the longer term and, to put it in terms of current costs, desalination of sea water would cost about 13 times more than the present bulk purified cost that applies in Cape Town at the moment.

That excludes the cost of local distribution.

If one compares the present day costs of desalinated water with conventional new projects, then the cost will be about four times, so the 13 ratio is based on historical costs of schemes which were implemented in the 70s.

The big problem is that in urban areas one has a large number of impoverished people who require a basic water supply at an affordable rate.

#### **Pilot Plant**

We have got a pilot plant at Bitterfontein in Namaqualand where we desalinate brack borehole water for a local community and that is quite an achievement.

[Question] How successful has the PK Le Roux irrigation scheme and the HF Verwoerd dam been and how many farmers benefit from this?

[Answer] I cannot tell you how many farmers are benefitting from the project but there are various indicators that there are new developments along the Orange river itself.

There have been large sales of water rights along the river so that individuals can develop their irrigation.

#### **Orange Developments**

Secondly there is development along the Sundays river, the Fish river and the Little Fish river which contain water imported from the Orange via the Orange-Fish tunnel.

The Sundays river system, the Fish and Little Fish rivers have been upgraded resulting in an improvement in the quality of the water which was at times very saline due to irrigation, the soils and the return flows.

We are now able to control the water quality far better by suitable flushing and mixing which is determined by simulation using computer models.

[Question] To what extent is it envisaged that water in the southern African region will double as a supplier of electricity through hydroelectric power schemes?

[Answer] There are still untapped resources in the Tugela so one could have further Drakensberg/Tugela Vaal type schemes which combine water transfer and pumped storage.

At the moment Eskom [Electricity Supply Commission] has sufficient capacity, however, so it is not imperative to develop further hydroelectric sources, but there will come a time when this type of scheme will be viable.

There are other cases, for instance, in the Steelpoort area, where Eskom is looking at pumped storage and at the same time we require water transfer up to various rural urban areas which we might be able to combine in this project.

[Question] How much water is recycled and what are the plans for additional recycling?

[Answer] We tried to make estimates of the quantity of water which is recycled in our management report Management of the Water Resources of the Republic of South Africa.

It is very complex, sometimes exceedingly difficult, to measure, particularly in return flows from irrigation because the water is dispersed.

The return flows from urban communities are much easier to measure and we have reasonable records on that.

#### **40 Percent of Water Lost**

If one takes the PWV area for instance, the return flow is about 60 percent of intake; in other words one loses 40 percent of the water to industries which tie up water into their product, or because it has evaporated, or on the domestic side, because it is lost to gardens.

Of that quantity of water some flows back to the Vaal river, is picked up again and fed back into the system while some goes to the northern treatment works and is transferred into the Hartebeespoort dam where it is used further for irrigation and urban industrial use.

#### **Recycling Problems**

Recycling has its problems because the water quality deteriorates, but we find that with improved water treatment works one can keep it within manageable values.

There is still a lot of scope for recycling; one thinks of areas such as Cape Town, Durban, and any of the other major metropolitan areas.

We have not really applied direct recycling, which has been carried out, for instance, in Windhoek, where the effluent is treated and fed straight back into the system.

Ours tends to be a more indirect recycling where the water is returned to a river source and then picked up again with the incoming fresh water and treated.

Research by the Water Research Commission is being carried out on internal recycling and industry, including power stations and mines, and has certainly played its role in improving the efficiency of water use.

[Question] What legislation exists to curb water pollution, is further legislation envisaged and is the battle against water pollution being won?

[Answer] The Water Act, 1956 makes provision for combating pollution through the issuing of permits and exemptions; controlling the numbers and quality of water and sewage works operating personnel; limiting the quality of effluents and waste materials through promulgated standards and conditional permits; and encouraging the development of sewerage schemes for the smaller local authorities through subsidies.

#### **Waste Disposal Sites**

The development and operation of waste disposal sites require permits issued by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry through the provisions of the Environmental Conservation Act 1989.

The Water Act has been amended no less than 27 times since first promulgated in 1956.

"Water Quality Management Policies and Strategies in the RSA [Republic of South Africa]" by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry spells out the status quo of the department's water quality management policies, possible future trends and areas where policies and strategies may have to be adapted after proper evaluation.

#### **Change of Approach**

To counter continuing deterioration of water quality and to meet the challenges of the future, the department changed its approach to water pollution control problems from applying uniform effluent standards (enforcing compliance to general and special effluent standards) to the approach of receiving water quality objectives for non-hazardous substances and to a pollution prevention approach for hazardous substances.

The fundamental water quality management goal is maintaining fitness for the recognised uses as defined in the Water Act; for example domestic, industrial, agricultural, environmental and recreational.

It may become necessary to amend the Water Act again or even redraft the act to implement the new approach to pollution control and water quality management.

[Question] What are the latest technological trends with regard to water storage, distribution and purification and to what extent is South Africa keeping abreast of these?

[Answer] South Africa is leading the world in the field of water treatment technology.

This statement has been confirmed many times by prominent specialists at national and international meetings where water management problems have been discussed in South Africa, as well as abroad.

#### **Water Conference**

This was repeated at the second Water Institute of Southern Africa (WISA) conference held at the World Trade Centre from 13-15 May this year.

South African engineers, scientists, technologists and operators have been commended, honoured and awarded for outstanding quality of papers and publications, particularly in renovating sewage and industrial effluents for unlimited re-use.

An aspect which sticks out like a sore thumb is the shortage of competently trained manpower to operate the increasingly complex effluent treatment plants which are necessary to handle the escalating pollution loads.

The department is, however, attending to this problem through a national steering committee. The WISA [expansion not given] and the Water Research Commission are also addressing this problem.

[Question] Are there any other issues you would like to discuss?

[Answer] One exciting aspect in the planning field which is going to extend to operations is the application of geographic information systems.

#### **Build Up of Data Banks**

The Department of Water Affairs has a sophisticated system for which we are building up the data banks.

When we do catchment studies, information is fed into the computer and it is easy to see for a particular catchment, like the Letaba river for example, the distribution of rainfall, the distribution of flow, where the urban areas are and where the forestry is and from this information one can see where the demand centres are and where the shortages are and it makes the planning process much more dynamic and very stimulating.

The system requires high powered technology, skilled operators and vast amounts of information which we are trying to get from different sources including the deeds office and the surveying/mapping office.



## Angola

### Van Dunem Discusses Role as Prime Minister

MB2307155991 Luanda Radio Nacional Network  
in Portuguese 1900 GMT 22 Jul 91

[News conference by Prime Minister Franca van Dunem upon his inauguration in Luanda on 22 July—recorded]

[Text] Franca van Dunem was today sworn in as prime minister of the People's Republic of Angola. The prime minister has a doctorate in law from the University of Utrecht in the Netherlands. He has worked for the OAU and the United Nations. He has also held several posts in the Angolan Government, the latest as planning minister. Speaking to Angolan journalists after being sworn in, Franca van Dunem said:

[Begin recording] [Van Dunem] One must not forget that under our Constitution the prime minister is not the head of government. The president of the Republic is the head of government. So, my role will be to assist the president of the Republic and the head of government. Furthermore, I will serve society in accordance with the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] program because the MPLA is the party in power.

[Reporter] Will your role cover all portfolios, or will the prime minister control specific portfolios?

[Van Dunem] My role will cover all portfolios. The prime minister will be nothing but what in Latin is known as *primus inter pares*, first among equals.

[Reporter] Will there be changes in the government's plan of action?

[Van Dunem] No. The government's plan of action was drafted and approved in 1990 and is being implemented. What we will do is instill new dynamism now that the peace accords have permitted a wider movement of people and goods.

I would like to take this opportunity to remind you that what has been happening of late is nothing new. The latest events are a follow up to what our comrade president began to do after his appointment as president of the Republic. The president of the Republic as well people with common sense like myself believed that we could not develop the country unless we first settled the problem of peace. That is why we went to New York and Bicesse. Now that peace has been achieved, we will implement our economic program.

[Reporter] Have the roles of prime minister and the secretary of the Council of Ministers been clearly defined?

[Van Dunem] The secretary of the Council of Ministers will continue to play his role. He will cooperate with the president of the Republic, like the prime minister. [end recording]

Prime Minister Franca van Dunem said that his office will be in the Futungo de Belas ward. The post of prime minister was reintroduced in the Angola under the terms of the partial revision of the Constitution. It will be recalled that Lopo do Nascimento served as prime minister from 1975 to 1978, but his post was abolished in terms of constitutional reforms.

## Madagascar

### Crowds Force Army To Withdraw From Square

AB2307113591 Paris AFP in French 1110 GMT  
23 Jul 91

[Text] Antananarivo, 23 Jul (AFP)—The soliders, posted since early this morning around the ministries, were forced to withdraw under pressure from the demonstrators at 1300 local time (1000 GMT), it was observed. The demonstrators, who keep growing in number, succeeded in crossing the security lines mounted by the military around several ministries, and the soldiers then rapidly evacuated Independence Square after firing tear gas into the crowds. The state of emergency was imposed on the capital and its province this morning.

### Opposition Ministers Said Kidnapped by Commandos

AB2307154591 Paris AFP in French 1128 GMT  
23 Jul 91

[Text] Antananarivo, July 23 (AFP)—Two Malagasy personalities, who were designated by the opposition as ministers in the "parallel government," Mr. Jaonarivelo and Mr. Jacques Rakotoniaina, have been kidnapped from their homes by a commando group numbering about 20 people, including soldiers, the secretary general of the Christian Democratic Movement (MDC), Lymy Rakotovao, asserted today.

Mr. Rakotoniaina, who has been appointed minister of industry and mines by the opposition, is the chairman of the MDC. According to his family, he was kidnapped from his home last night. As for Mr. Jaonarivelo, who is a magistrate, he was kidnapped at 0620 local time [0320 GMT] by a similar commando group. According to the MDC secretary general, the commando group is made up of members of the Arema (the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution), President Didier Ratsiraka's party.

### Legal Government Proclaims State of Emergency

AB2307223091 Libreville Africa No. 1 in French  
1830 GMT 23 Jul 91

[Excerpts] President Didier Ratsiraka's government has decided to thwart the opposition's initiatives by proclaiming a state of emergency today in the Antananarivo Prefectures and its immediate suburbs, following the opposition's decision to take over the ministries and have its representatives take office. But the Active Force

Committee has challenged the curfew and state of emergency. Mr. Ober Rabenour, a member of the opposition government, who spoke to Guy-Bertrand Mapangou on the phone, describes the atmosphere in the Malagasy capital since this morning:

[Begin recording] [passage omitted] [Mapangou] Mr. Rabenour, it seems that within the ranks of the Army there is a sort of complicity with the active forces. Do you have any contact with the Army, notably with high-ranking officers?

[Rabenour] You know, we would not have dared form this government and appoint a head of state and a head of government, an act of insurrection by itself which would have prompted retaliation from the legal government—we would not have done all this, we would have not made such grave decisions if we were not sure of the benevolent neutrality of the Army as well as that of its officers, notably its generals and high-ranking officers. This does not only involve high-ranking officers and generals, but also privates.

[Mapangou] Do you have any information on the arrest of two ministers of the transitional government?

[Rabenour] Yes, two ministers have been arrested. Of course, we are concerned because we do not know where they are now. But the people of Antananarivo who say they are staying in the square tonight are demanding information about them. They decided to challenge the curfew and will stay there all night long. [end recording]

### **Government Announces All Ministries Functioning**

EA2407084291 Antananarivo Radio Madagascar  
Network in Malagasy 1845 GMT 23 Jul 91

[Statement issued by the government; place and date not given]

[Text] Since Monday 22 July, there have been forcible entries into and occupation of some ministries' headquarters in the capital, followed by an announcement to the effect that transfers of power had been made between the respective ministries, including, for example, at the Ministry of Finance and National Budget. What should be known, however, is that all the ministries and the government headed by Colonel Victor Ramahatra are functioning and continuing with their assigned duties.

Such transfers of power never took place, neither between officials nor in any other manner. The announcement that the active forces were the ones who dealt with the payment of civil servants' salaries during the current month is groundless, as all the documents authorizing the payment of civil servants' salaries for the current month were processed under the supervision of the relevant ministry and were dispatched to all corners of the country—that is to say, throughout Madagascar. And it is still the respective ministers in place that dealt with the payment of the civil servants' salaries during the

current month [word indistinct] Antananarivo town and who received them with cash vouchers.

### **Demonstrators Defy State of Emergency 24 Jul**

AB2407085591 Paris AFP in French 0730 GMT  
24 Jul 91

[Text] Antananarivo, 24 July (AFP)—Tens of thousands of demonstrators this morning were heading toward the center of the Malagasy capital, Antananarivo, on the second day of the state of emergency, which bans all public gatherings.

After a calm night, during which the opposition finally decided not to defy the curfew imposed on the capital and its environs yesterday, sympathizers of the Committee of the Active Forces ("Hery Velona" in Malagasy, which groups almost all the opposition) headed again for the 13 May Square, where no military presence was noted.

The Malagasy Red Cross announced this morning that 13 people were slightly injured in incidents which took place yesterday in front of the national radio station. The opposition, which tried in vain yesterday to occupy the radio station, reportedly intends to renew its action today.

### **'Tens of Thousands' Demonstrate; 1 Death Reported**

AB2407095891 Paris AFP in English 0946 GMT  
24 Jul 91

[Excerpt] Antananarivo, 24 July (AFP)—One person was reported killed as tens of thousands of demonstrators defied a ban on public gatherings and converged Wednesday on a central square a day after a state of emergency was declared in and around Madagascar's capital.

The government newspaper LE JOURNAL DE MADAGASCAR said a paramilitary policeman was killed Tuesday during clashes in front of the capital's radio station, where opposition supporters had gathered. But a spokesman for the Red Cross, which has been involved in first aid work in recent weeks since mass anti-government rallies began, said the organization had evacuated the gendarme but had no knowledge of his death. The Red Cross said 13 people were slightly hurt in Tuesday's incidents.

Witnesses said no troops were present in 13 May square on Wednesday, but about 50 soldiers took up position outside the Communication and Culture Ministry, which the opposition took over on Tuesday and has been using as its headquarters. Opposition leaders were meeting inside and were to go later to 13 May Square a spokesman said. "We are going to ask the population to come with us and take over the (national) radio," said the opposition's shadow minister for communications Honore Razafindramiandra. An opposition attempt to seize the radio headquarters on Monday failed.

A strike committee at the Communication Ministry pushed back the troops, whose commanding officer told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE they were there "only to protect the building from possible provocateurs."

On Tuesday beleaguered President Didier Ratsiraka declared a state of emergency and ordered the arrest of opposition figures named as ministers in an alternative government. Armed men abducted two opposition figures named as ministers, according to an opposition leader. [passage omitted]

### Mauritius

#### \* EEC Sugar Allocation Raised 12,000 Tons

91AF1231A Port Louis LE MAURICIEN in French  
14 May 91 pp 1, 4

[Text] Mauritius will benefit from an additional allocation of about 12,000 tons of sugar under the Sugar Protocol. This was announced on 13 May by Minister of Agriculture Madun Dulloo.

This reallocation follows a shortfall in the order of 47,000 tons in Guiana, which has a quota of 159,000 tons of sugar.

Minister Madun Dulloo returned to Mauritius on 13 May after participating in the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the ACP [African, Caribbean, and Pacific] Countries, as well as a meeting between the ACP countries and the EEC.

Along with attending these two meetings the minister of agriculture led a delegation made up of representatives of the ACP sugar-producing countries during a working meeting with an EEC delegation chaired by the Luxembourg minister of agriculture.

During this meeting the EEC gave a guarantee that measures will be taken to protect the ACP countries in case a change of regime occurs during negotiations with GATT.

The Mauritian minister of agriculture also stated that the EEC has provided assurances that the Sugar Protocol will not be placed in question at any time.

### Mozambique

#### Further Delay in Rome Peace Talks Reported

MB2407061891 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network  
in Portuguese 0500 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] The seventh round of peace talks between the Mozambican Government and Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] in the Italian capital has not yet begun, although the two delegations have been there since last weekend. The MOZAMBIQUE INFORMATION AGENCY's correspondent cites sources close to the negotiating process as revealing that the Renamo

delegation is unable to establish radio links with its leaders inside Mozambique and that it is using this as another pretext to delay talks.

The correspondent reports that radio links between the Renamo delegation in Rome and the Canxixe area in Sofala Province are maintained through Malawi. The Malawian authorities, however, have expelled from the country the Renamo members who operated the radio equipment. The reasons for the expulsion are not yet known. The correspondent cites sources in Rome as pointing out that the Malawian Government considered the behavior of the Renamo technicians unacceptable.

The Renamo delegation in Rome is as usual led by External Relations Department chief Raul Domingos, and the beginning of the seventh round of peace talks will depend on the resumption of radio links. The correspondent learned that the Italian mediators are trying to resolve the problem with the Malawian authorities.

Other reports say that the Italian ambassador to Mozambique, who is also one of the mediators, is trying to meet with Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama. According to the correspondent, the mediators have not yet said anything about the delay in the seventh round of peace talks and refuse to speak to the press.

Transportation and Communications Minister Armando Guebuza, who is the leader of the Mozambican Government delegation, has repeatedly expressed the desire to resume talks as soon as possible. Guebuza told reporters on two occasions that his delegation would like to conclude during this round the entire 20-point working agenda agreed upon by the two sides last May.

The meeting, which was expected to take place in Rome last Friday [19 July] between Dhlakama and Jeffrey Davidow, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, did not materialize, and the Renamo leader has not yet explained the reason for this.

#### \* New Beira Container Terminal To Be Completed

91AF1220A Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
13 Jun 91 p 3

[Article by Goncalves Gauth]

[Text] A portion of the new multi-function container terminal at the Beira railroad-port complex will begin operating the end of first quarter of next year. NOTICIAS learned from a source connected with the sector, who added that after the Italian consortium Empreglio Sadelmi completely finishes construction, with European Economic Community (EEC) financing, operations in the new terminal will be able to handle 100,000 "TEUS" (20-foot containers) per year.

According to Carlos Mesquita, an official linked to the container sector in that port city, once the temporary

terminal's operations have been transferred to the permanent one, the new stage of the "Beira Corridor" integrated project, known as the "fourth phase," will begin. This phase, the project documentation of which is now being prepared, may be financed by the Swedish and Finnish governments.

Regarding the objectives of this fourth phase, that official said it was necessary to ensure continuity of personnel training, technical assistance for key positions, and the supply of diverse equipment to the future container loading and receiving area.

Reporters from our Beira delegation also learned that besides the equipment cofinanced by those two Nordic countries, the new terminal already has three container-moving cranes, each with 40-tonne capacity, acquired under African Development Bank (ADB) financing. At the same location, the Finnish Government has made certain funds available for the construction of an equipment maintenance office and transit warehouse, with these works now in the final stages of completion.

Regarding the growing container traffic over the last three years in that railroad-port facility, our source also told us that the monitoring function for that type of merchandise handling has already been computerized.

It is expected, in addition, that after various simulations a specific monitoring program will have been developed, that can be generalized for use in any Mozambican port.

#### **Responding to SADCC Objectives**

Until 1987, the port at Beira was handling containers, but in a disorganized fashion. Because of political reasons at the time in that region of Africa, there was every need to organize it to respond to the objectives of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

It was thus in that perspective that the need to implement the new activities integrated into the Beira Corridor project plan was defined, to efficiently and adequately respond to SADCC member countries.

The definition and implementation of the aforementioned activities led to, among other things, initiation of the temporary container terminal project, also known as TCT, with a three-year action plan, also co-financed by Sweden and Finland.

The project, apart from organizing container handling, had among other objectives the integrated training of personnel both inside and outside the country, the acquisition of equipment, and technical assistance.

Since that time, plans set for the terminal have grown year after year. For example, in 1990 17,103 TEUS were handled, compared to 15,279 in 1988. This year the plan is to handle 18,000 of that type of merchandise container.

"Zimbabwe is the country shipping the largest number of TEUS, followed by Malawi, Botswana and Zambia," the source stated.

#### **Training, A Necessity**

Training is pointed to in that sector as indispensable for the proper execution of activities, to provide an efficient response to users of that complex.

It is known, however, that various overseas training activities in the area of port administration at intermediate and superior levels are already planned within the framework of existing cooperation between the Mozambican government and the countries financing the Beira Corridor project.

Last year, for example, the cooperation already resulted in port administration and operations training for a group of 12 workers from CFM-Centro, a company associated with the TCT. The course, which took place in Finland, lasted six months. According to that source, personnel training outside the country is occurring simultaneously with training domestically.

Referring specifically to technical-assistance objectives, our source said that the aim is to transfer knowledge and know-how to the country, a factor that has led to a gradual reduction in this assistance and to all the work being performed by Mozambican personnel.

He stated that from the beginning of the temporary terminal's operations until the current phase, a large campaign was carried out for the allocation of Mozambican counterpart resources, in which 12 foreign officials also joined to service that important merchandise-handling sector.

#### **\* Nampula Population Growth Worries Authorities**

*91AF1220D Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
15 Jun 91 p 3*

[Text] With the migration of people from the countryside to the cities, the Nampula City Executive Council has been forced to assign plots of land for housing construction in areas reserved for the development and expansion of the industrial park and other restricted areas, such as in the Mutombe, Napipine and Mutauanha zones.

The Executive Council still feels incapable of removing people from those areas, although it has announced the expansion of the city's designated residential zone by approximately 10 km.

A local Executive Council source believes that these people's movement to the city causes not only urban overpopulation but also contributes to the rapid physical degradation of its infrastructure, in addition to endangering other social aspects of the populations living there.



In effect, it has become normal to observe city residents everywhere engaging in immoral acts, committing with impunity acts of physical aggression, robbery, and increasingly prostitution and adultery, among other evils that many point to as stemming from the overpopulation of the urban and surrounding areas. In this respect, it is recalled that the city of Nampula was constructed for 60,000 inhabitants, but today shelters more than 200,000, most of them in precarious circumstances.

The city's overpopulation also increases garbage production, a situation worsened by the fact that the Nampula City Executive Council has no vehicles to collect and remove it from public streets.

In this sense, the Executive Council source observed that it has been at least 10 years since vehicles in the fleet used for these public services have been restored or replaced. Originally, the fleet was comprised of four vehicles, which are currently all immobilized.

Despite requests to the relevant authorities to find ways of equipping the urban services with their own and adequate resources, nothing has been accomplished. Currently these services consist of only one tractor to carry out work in the entire city, which barely succeeds in lessening the problem.

Previously, to resolve the situation of garbage on the public streets, the city authorities called upon residents and businesses to collaborate in removing and collecting the garbage.

Some lent a hand, while the majority merely stood by as spectators, ignoring a problem that constantly endangers the inhabitants' health, a situation that is occurring at a time when an outbreak of cholera has exploded in the city and has already taken human lives.

#### \* Status of Inhambane Cattle Industry Noted

91AF1220F Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese  
18 Jun 91 p 3

[Text] More than 34,500 heads of cattle were counted last year in Inhambane Province, an increase of almost one percent over the previous year. In an exclusive statement to NOTICIAS, the official responsible for the Provincial Cattle Services, Dr. Celestino Linha, said that the growth in this sector in 1990 is primarily a result of new counting methods, which has permitted better coverage in the districts.

Animal productivity is extremely low, Celestino Linha emphasized, blaming extreme mobility in the family sector—which holds the largest number of heads of cattle—as one of the primary causes. The official responsible for the Inhambane Provincial Cattle Services also told us that other anomalies that are factors in the decline of the bovine species in the province are the clandestine slaughter of cattle, including females, and rustling. "The number of heads of cattle that were stolen

last year alone, and which were reported to us, totaled 321, with Morrumbene occupying the head of the list," he said.

#### The Census

Clarifying that the census counting is obligatory for cattle, goats and sheep, Celestino Linha added that in 1990 34,555 cattle, 19,145 goats and 4,442 sheep had been counted. Also counted were 11,146 pigs, 126,869 chickens and 18,326 ducks.

In the view of the Inhambane Provincial Cattle Services official, the greatest concentration of cattle is in Massinga and Panda districts. "They are the zones with the best conditions for raising livestock, and also have a minimum of security," he said, adding:

"Despite our efforts last year to cover all districts in the cattle census, we are aware that many more exist than we counted, because people do not tell us the exact number of livestock they own, out of fear the State will confiscate them.

"It is an issue that is lodged in the people's heads. And no matter how often we say that our objective in the census is merely to find out the exact number of animals in the province, people do not believe it and do not tell us the truth."

#### Animal Health

Regarding animal health, Celestino Linha revealed that there is a cattle vaccination campaign in progress in Inhambane Province and that by last April 20 percent of the animals had been vaccinated against hematic carbuncle and 18 percent against symptomatic carbuncle.

The vaccinations, he said, are being carried out in all districts of the province, and in the vaccination campaign against "newcastle," a disease primarily affecting chickens, "we have achieved three percent of our annual goal, and against rabies 13 percent."

In statements to our Inhambane correspondent, he added that only 27 galvanized water tanks are in working order, and that another 27 were shut down because of the terrorist activities of the Renamo [Mozambican National Resistance] armed groups.

In the districts where galvanized tanks do not exist, or if they do exist they are shut down, the Provincial Cattle Services have constructed corrals to permit removal of the parasites from the cattle.

"Even if the tanks are functioning, we face various difficulties in carrying out our activities. For example, at the 25,000-liter galvanized tank at Jangamo, the pump is broken and the tank has to be filled and emptied manually, which is not the most efficient," he said.

## Zambia

### \* End of Obligatory ZCTU Tie 'Weakens' Unions

91AF1237A Lusaka SUNDAY TIMES OF ZAMBIA  
in English 2 Jun 91 p 1

[Text] SUNDAY TIMES Report ZIMCO [Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation] executive director for transport Mr Michael Mulenga has criticized the 1990 Industrial Relations Act pointing out that the labor court itself will become important in solving industrial disputes.

Speaking at the annual meeting of the Zambia Institute of Personnel Management (ZIPM) at Lusaka's Pamodzi Hotel yesterday, he said the other implication would be the weakened control from central organizations of both the unions and the employees associations.

He said the trade union would no longer be obliged to affiliate to the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and that this could cause great disarray.

Speaking on the theme "implications of the 1990 Industrial Relations Act in the Third Republic," he said under the new Act aggrieved parties had the right to appeal to the Supreme Court if they were not satisfied with the judgement of the Industrial Relations court.

He said there was the procedural matter provided for in the new clause 93 of the new Act whereby failure to reach conciliation was either referred to the court or people go on strike.

"It would seem that perhaps the strike course will be followed in spite of the fact that the law requires the balloting of all eligible employees concerned.

He recalled that although the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 had been in operation for nearly 20 years there were many personnel practitioners who had not really read it thoroughly so as to master its contents.

He said he experienced this anomaly at the meetings of the Prices and Incomes Commission (PIC) where collective agreements were being considered.

He said the 1971 Industrial Relations Act had the desire to have single strong unions in each undertaking and to achieve this certain policy restrictions were placed on the formation of unions.

### \* UTH Review Reveals 'Bad Planning'

dispute. It is an eyesore which is now widely despised by those seeking proper medical care.

What the public did not know, however, was that the UTH has in fact already been certified "dead" by the professionals who run it, who have since acknowledged the hospital's inability to provide adequate medical care in its present state.

Past appeals to higher authorities to save the hospital from collapse have gone unheeded thereby exacerbating the poor state the hospital is in.

The result: An eerie atmosphere now hovers over the hospital as death stalks the patients. Doctors watch helplessly as the hospital counts its dead, victims of the neglect the institution has suffered over the years.

The UTH board of management paper sums it all up: "It is clear from the review of the current status of medical care that the hospital is virtually at a standstill and merely a poor hostel for patients to sleep in".

With such chilling admissions from the hospital management it is hardly surprising so many people dread the prospect of ending up in UTH. It is also not surprising that Zambia's biggest hospital has earned itself the sobriquet title "university killing hospital."

For it is true that many patients suffering from treatable and controllable diseases have ended up in the UTH morgue. What a pity.

The sordid details about the pathetic situation at UTH revealed in our lead story today will certainly send a cold chill down the spines of many concerned Zambians.

Those responsible for this criminal neglect must not shed crocodile tears; they must act pragmatically and see to it that the imminent collapse of UTH is averted. If it means diverting funds from some grandiose projects, which are irrelevant, this must be done now to save lives.

Given the scarcity of resources, the decision to dish out hefty housing allowances to civil servants (including married women who are already housed), can hardly be termed prudent economic management—certainly not when hospital pharmacies are empty.

As election day draws nearer, it might be tempting to do what is politically expedient at times as opposed to what is economically expedient. Unless such appeasement policies are discarded, it will be well nigh impossible to

## Benin

### Union Leader on Stalemate in Government Talks

AB2307220091 Cotonou Office de Radiodiffusion-  
Television du Benin Radio Network in French 1930  
GMT 22 Jul 91

[Text] After the ultimatum of the public administration workers, the warning strike which has been paralyzing [words indistinct]. It goes without saying that there has been no agreement between the union of public administration workers and the government. In the opinion of the trade unionists, even though they are prepared to resume work, a lot of things remain to be done. This opinion was expressed by Mr. (Latif Tahiro), information secretary of the union, in an interview with Ceron Amotche:

[Begin recording] [(Tahiro)] From the meeting with the head of state, we did not get any element that can make us talk of compromise. What we are going to do is revise the contents of the issues to be discussed with the head of state, and on this basis we will know what has to be done.

[Amotche] [question indistinct]

[(Tahiro)] In any case we represent the grass roots, and if we are not satisfied there is no reason for the grass roots to be satisfied. In any case, we are going to give an objective report on this meeting and each one will draw his own conclusion.

[Amotche] But can your stand somehow influence your union members?

[(Tahiro)] We make do with what we have. I cannot tell members that everything is going well, that we are satisfied, when that is not the case. I will be asked what I have been able to get. We talked about early retirements which will not be implemented in 1991, but how many months are we away from 1992? Only five months. If we cannot reach an agreement now, there is the risk of this thing resuming in 1992. So I think it is in the government's interest to clearly respond once and for all on this. [end recording]

The development of dialogue undertaken by both sides is about to end in a compromise, and it is this compromise that has cleared away the crisis. Tomorrow workers will resume work in all departments.

## Ivory Coast

### Journalists Jailed for 'Insulting' President

AB2307131591 Paris AFP in French 1059 GMT  
23 Jul 91

[Text] Abidjan, 23 July (AFP)—This morning two Ivorian journalists who have been remanded in custody for nearly seven weeks were sentenced to three months in prison with no possibility of remission by the Abidjan Court of Summary Jurisdiction for "insulting" the head

of state, an AFP reporter observed. While the court was giving its ruling, clashes broke out between demonstrators and the security forces which barred access to the court rooms. At least two demonstrators were injured when soldiers and the anti-riot police violently dispersed about 200 people with belts and tear gas, it was noted. The demonstrators replied with stones before dispersing at about 0945.

This is the first time that journalists of the private press have been jailed in Ivory Coast, where some 30 newspapers have sprung up since the announcement of multi-party politics was made on 30 April 1990. Mr. Jacques Kacou, managing editor of the LIBERTE weekly, a paper close to the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI—the main opposition party), and Georges Coffi, a journalist, were sued for publishing an article headed: "Watch Out! Houphouet is Losing His Mind." This article, among others, described President Felix Houphouet-Boigny as a "tyrant" and a "terrorist." The defense counsel for the two men argued that the article in question referred to Houphouet-Boigny as chairman of the (ruling) Democratic Party of Ivory Coast (PDCI) and not Houphouet-Boigny as head of state. Mr. Coffi was found guilty of the offense, while Mr. Kacou was sentenced as an accomplice. The journalists were also fined 1.8 million CFA francs (36,000 French francs) each.

Last week, the public prosecutor called for a one-year jail term without possibility of remission for Mr. Kacou and Mr. Coffi, who were remanded in custody on 5 and 7 June, respectively, and saw their applications for bail turned down. The journalists' lawyers are expected to appeal against the ruling, a source close to the FPI disclosed.

[Paris AFP in English at 1248 GMT adds: "Riot police and gendarmes later fired tear gas canisters and stun grenades to disperse about 1,000 demonstrators who left the court and regrouped at the Justice Ministry around Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the main opposition Ivorian Popular Front (FPI). There were no new reports of injuries, but journalists saw 10 cars and buses smashed by the crowd. Shopowners closed up before mid-day while many roadside vendors were looted by youths taking advantage of the pandemonium in Abidjan's central Plateau district, where the ministries and many embassies are located. Mr. Gbagbo, who lost in the Ivory Coast's first multiparty presidential polls last October, told AFP his group had sent a delegation to meet Justice Ministry officials to protest against an "illegal" search Monday of the party's second-in-charge, Abdou Dramane Sangare. Opposition sources said the search turned up nothing. Demonstrators called Mr. Houphouet-Boigny a 'dictator' and an 'assassin,' adding that 'there is no democracy in the Ivory Coast.' Security forces confiscated the film of an AFP photographer."

Paris AFP in French at 1220 GMT on 23 July adds: "A few minutes before the demonstrators were dispersed, FPI leader Laurent Gbagbo told journalists that his party



'will henceforth give tit for tat for provocations by the Democratic Party of Ivory Coast,' the ruling party.'"]

## Togo

### National Conference Discusses Assassination Rumors

AB2307212591 Libreville Africa No. 1 in French  
1830 GMT 22 Jul 91

[Text] Deliberations of the Togolese national conference continue in the absence of the Togolese Government and Armed Forces. As we expected today, the presidium replied to yesterday's statement by the minister of defense who denounced the slanderous verbal attacks against the Army which today reaffirmed its loyalty to Gnassingbe Eyadema, the head of state, elected by universal suffrage. Here is a report from Lome by Crepin Nganga, our special correspondent.

[Begin recording] [Nganga] Monsignor Sanouko Kpodzro explained how he found himself at the Presidential Palace on the head of state's invitation when he had not yet been elected chairman of the presidium. He particularly emphasized this point.

[Kpodzro] Point No.1: The difficulty [words indistinct] to have the Togolese Armed Forces take part in the national conference. Point No.2 : It would be necessary to respect in our debates the head of state's dignity because of his office. Point No.3: The ambiguity contained in the expression: a prime minister elected by the conference. I have some remarks to make on these three points:

1. It is unthinkable that the Togolese Armed Forces will not take part in the meeting of the nation's active forces, an extensive meeting which will examine all issues of national interest. The Togolese Armed Forces should not refuse to execute the instructions given [words indistinct] the head of state is also the head of the Army. In any case, I have clearly said that [words indistinct] to chair a national conference in the absence of the Army, which can jeopardize the reconciliation which this meeting aims to achieve. I also made it clear that I was ready to respectfully refuse the mandate given to me by the people if the army refuses to take part in the deliberations.

2. Respect of the head of state's dignity—I did not fail, in my capacity as a delegate representing the clergy, to draw the head of state's attention to the fact that it will be impossible to avoid showdowns. Once these issues are solved, the representatives should feel relieved. [applause]

3. I remember saying that the prime minister should be elected by the conference and that he cannot be chosen otherwise.

[Nganga] Following the adoption of the previous session's report, the deliberations continue with the presentation of the various communications. Not minding the strong remarks by the minister of defense, most of the speakers continue to rail at the regime which is being described negatively.

Finally, a letter was submitted to the minister of interior following persistent rumors of a possible destabilization of the conference and assassination of the opposition's political leaders. Extremist elements of the Army and henchmen from abroad had reportedly been hired and were ready to act, according to the letter. The minister of interior has been called on to take his responsibilities. [end recording]

[Paris AFP in French at 1900 GMT on 22 July in a Lome datelined item adds: "Today the chairman of the Togolese national conference asked the authorities to 'check the validity of rumors' that extremist elements of the Togolese Army were getting ready to assassinate opposition leaders. Mgr. Sanouko Kpodzro has sent a letter to the minister of interior which was read at the resumption of the radio and television broadcast debates.

["This letter asked the authorities to 'check the validity of rumors according to which extremist elements of the Togolese Armed Forces had decided to execute early on 23 July a plot to assassinate some members of the opposition taking part in the conference.' The letter states that according to the same rumors, 'some Africans in plain clothes were reportedly flown in to take part in acts of destabilization, the direct consequence of this plot.' The letter recalls 'the commitment made the government ensure the security of participants to the conference.'

["The government and Army delegation were still absent from the conference today. They left on 16 July after the conference decided to proclaim its sovereignty and suspend the constitution.

["Furthermore, in a communique today the government reaffirmed that Antoine Meatchi, the former vice president of Togo (from 1963 to 1967) had been 'the victim of a heart attack on 6 February 1984 at the Mango civilian prison where he was held for a criminal crime.' One of the delegates, a former prison mate of Meatchi, said on 20 July that the former vice president 'did not die of a heart attack but of black diet (forced fasting without water)."]

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

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